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3Preface
The relationship between the six founding EU members and, first of all, 
African countries and territories has for a long time been very important. This 
was the case even before they signed the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957. In 
the decades that followed, historical ties as well as the changing international 
environment to a considerable extent formed the European Union´s relations 
with the developing countries. The primordial constitutional set up and 
subsequent constitutional developments, however, played an important part 
in forming the Union’s development cooperation policy. The object of the 
present report is to examine the legal impact of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty on 
the Union’s development cooperation policy, in particular by placing it in its 
historical context.
“EU external action in the field of development cooperation policy – The 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty” is the fourth report published in the context 
of the SIEPS research project The EU external action and the Treaty of 
Lisbon. It provides a well-timed evaluation of the implications that the Lisbon 
Treaty has had on the external posture of the European Union in a field that 
traditionally has played an important role in the European Union’s external 
policy; namely development cooperation.
Jörgen Hettne
Acting Director
SIEPS carries out multidisciplinary research in current European affairs.
As an independent governmental agency, we connect academic analysis
and policy-making at Swedish and European levels.
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6Executive summary
This report identifies and accounts for the institutional and substantive 
changes made to the European Union’s development cooperation policy by 
the Lisbon Treaty.*1 It assesses to what extent and how these changes affect 
the ability of the “European area” (i.e. the sum of EU and Member States) 
to act as a coherent and effective player on the international scene in the 
field of development cooperation. The report examines only the legal and 
constitutional aspects of the EU’s development cooperation, i.e. those aspects 
which are directly related to primary EU law, including notably the Treaties, 
rather than to secondary legislation. 
Leaving aside the special provisions on the overseas countries and territories 
(OCTs), during the period from the entry into force of the Rome Treaty in 
1958 and until the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, it was 
mainly left for the Court of Justice to define the basic legal framework for 
the Union’s development cooperation policy. In case law from this period, the 
Court largely supported the Commission’s approach with regard to the place 
and importance of development cooperation policy in the EU constitutional 
system. During this period the Court accepted that the common commercial 
policy, the Union’s predominant external policy at the time, could be 
broadly construed, and thus used to pursue development cooperation policy 
objectives. In this way, important aspects of development cooperation policy 
were brought within the confines of the Union’s exclusive competence. The 
report shows that, apart from relations with the OCTs, the legal constitutional 
framework established in this case law created a trade-biased foundation 
for the Union’s and the Member States’ development cooperation policy. 
Another important finding with regards to this first period is that the Union’s 
development cooperation policy competence was weak outside the common 
commercial policy field. As a third important finding with respect to the first 
period, the report shows that it was clear from early on that the financing 
mechanism formed an important way to influence the Union’s development 
cooperation policy. Attempts by the European Parliament to gain influence 
through its budgetary prerogatives were not supported by the Commission 
and failed when the Court firmly rejected to expand the concurrent nature 
of the Union’s development cooperation policy competence through the 
Parliament’s budgetary powers.
* Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. 
7A second period began with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993. With this Treaty, the Union’s development cooperation was given a Title 
in the EC Treaty, and thus a policy of its own. This continues to constitute 
the single most important constitutional change to the EU’s development 
cooperation policy. The new Treaty provisions were based on three legs 
laying down the principles, inter alia, for how the European Union and the 
Member States were to cooperate in the field of development cooperation. 
Nevertheless, also after Maastricht, new competence conflicts over the 
precise delimitation of the European Union’s development cooperation policy 
vis-à-vis other policies arose. Moreover, after Maastricht, the “cohabitation” 
of development cooperation and the European Union’s promotion of its own 
values (in particular, human rights and democracy) was challenged.
A third period was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force 
in 2009. This Treaty introduced a number of changes to the constitutional 
legal framework, which governs the Union’s development cooperation policy. 
Some of these changes are codifications and (technical) adjustments, which 
will not give rise to significant problems in the future. Other changes may 
have a longer-lasting impact and carry the potential for future constitutional 
conflicts, which may influence on the Union’s ability to carry out an effective 
development cooperation policy. First and foremost, by reorganising and 
streamlining the development cooperation policy objectives, the Lisbon 
Treaty leaves a lasting constitutional impact on the Union’s development 
cooperation policy. The explication and reorganisation of the Union’s external 
relations objectives and principles and the streamlining of the development 
cooperation policy objective (i.e. the identification of poverty reduction/
eradication as a primary objective) are likely to have a lasting constitutional 
impact on policy-making and legal methodology in this area. Presumably, 
this change will be incremental and therefore probably largely unnoticed 
in the day-to-day politics. Furthermore, it seems likely that post-Lisbon the 
European Union’s development cooperation policy is faced with three main 
legal, constitutional challenges:
The organisation of the financial aid aspect of the European Union’s 
development cooperation policy remains crucial. 
Finding the right constitutional balance for development cooperation policy 
vis-à-vis other policies
The relationship between the 28 Member States’ development cooperation 
policies and that of the European Union.
In addition to these three main legal, constitutional challenges, the report 
points out that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced new battlefields for 
8institutional conflicts, including that between the Parliament and the 
Commission concerning the choice between delegating and implementing 
acts and that concerning division of tasks between the Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS).
Overall, the report concludes that, despite the fact that the old constitutional 
challenges remain, it is possible to identify two overall positive tendencies: 
First, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the European 
Union has had a development cooperation policy framework with a global 
and comprehensive outlook. Second, thanks to four decades of Court of 
Justice rulings, this policy is now governed by well-known legal principles 
— including notably principles to define the legal basis and the duty of 
loyal cooperation — some of which have even been refined and, partly, 
codified in the Lisbon Treaty. The global outlook of the Union’s development 
cooperation policy post Lisbon, and the increasing institutionalisation of 
the legal constitutional framework, which governs this policy, are positive 
signs that the Union and its Member States are moving towards a framework, 
which will gradually construct a more coherent and efficient development 
cooperation policy for the EU. 
91 Introduction
In this report, we identify and account for the institutional and substantive 
changes made to the European Union’s development cooperation policy by 
the Lisbon Treaty.1 Our aim is to assess to what extent and how these changes 
affect the ability of the “European area” (i.e. the sum of EU and Member 
States) to act as a coherent and effective player on the international scene 
in the field of development cooperation.2 In the report, we examine only the 
legal and constitutional aspects of the EU’s development cooperation, i.e. 
those aspects which are directly related to primary EU law, including notably 
the Treaties, rather than to secondary legislation. 
In section 2, we provide an overview of the road leading from the entry into 
force of the Rome Treaty3 in 1958 until the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force 
in 2009. On this basis, in section 3, we turn to analysing the changes brought 
about by the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, in section 4, we summarise our findings 
and identify what we consider to be the three main constitutional challenges 
for European Union development cooperation policy in the future.
1.1 From Rome to Lisbon
1.1.1 Taking stock – looking back
We begin with an account of the development of the EU’s legal constitutional 
framework for development cooperation. As is the case for most of the EU’s 
external policies, the piecemeal and case law based evolution of its legal 
framework is important to bear in mind in order to understand the place and 
nature of EU development policy today. There are at least two reasons for 
this: 
Firstly, we assume that there is a dialectic interaction between the legal 
constitutional framework within which a particular policy must be confined, 
1 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. 
2 This report is about the division of competence between the European Union (as such) 
and its Member States. In this regard, it is useful to apply a terminology that enables us to 
distinguish between the “Member States” and the “European Union”. Moreover, apart 
from where we use quotations, as a rule, we do not distinguish between European Economic 
Community, European Community, and European Union, but instead we use the term 
“European Union”. On the other hand, we have been careful to distinguish between the “EC 
Treaty” (EC Treaty as well as EEC Treaty), “EU Treaty”, “Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union”, and “Treaty on European Union”.
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Treaty or EEC Treaty]. 
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and the output of this policy. The way that the legal framework for a particular 
Union policy – such as trade, environment, or development cooperation 
– is construed is a product of the priorities at the time of the relevant EU 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) when the final formulation of the policy 
is decided. In addition, the subsequent interpretation and application of the 
framework will be affected by the evolving political priorities and needs. 
Simultaneously, when a policy is in place, we may also expect that the legal 
framework chosen will structure and bias the policy choices made.
Secondly, when looking at the contemporary challenges in today’s 
European Union development cooperation policy, we submit, the main legal 
constitutional challenges are not new, though some of them have taken on 
a new shape with the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, some of these still-existing 
challenges have even resulted in conflicts, which have been dealt with prior 
to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, directly or indirectly, by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, as we shall see below.
In section 2.2, we first consider the phase that began with the entry into 
force of the Rome Treaty in 1958 – a time when several of the founding 
Member States were still colonial powers. Even though de-colonisation 
gained momentum during the 1960s, it was not until the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty4 in 1993 that the Union’s development cooperation 
policy was reflected at Treaty-level through the introduction of a specific 
Title on development cooperation policy in the EC Treaty.5 The entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty probably constitutes the single most important 
constitutional milestone in the European Union’s development cooperation 
policy, and therefore naturally marks the beginning of the second phase. This 
second phase, which lasted until 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force, is considered in section 2.3. 
1.2 Rome to Maastricht
1.2.1  Development cooperation policy under the Rome Treaty 
– weak constitutional foundation
The first phase of European Union development cooperation policy stretches 
across a 35-year period – i.e. from the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1958 and until the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. This 
phase is first of all characterised by a narrow and incomplete conception of 
4 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
5 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (CE 321) 1 [hereinafter EC Treaty or EC]. 
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EU development cooperation policy and, consequently, a weak constitutional 
basis for this policy. In particular, the Rome Treaty did not provide an explicit 
legal basis for a global, coherent policy in the field. This is not to say that 
development cooperation was not part of that Treaty. France, supported 
by Belgium, made it a condition of signing up to the Rome Treaty that the 
European Union would establish and maintain permanent relations with 
what at the time of the negotiations were Member State colonies.6 Hence, 
under Part IV of the Rome Treaty, “association status”7 was accorded to the 
so-called Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), meaning those non-
European countries and territories that had “special relations with Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands”, as it was phrased in Article 131 of the 
Treaty of Rome.8 
For the OCTs, the main implication of being granted association status was 
that the tariff measures that applied among the EU members were extended 
to the former, thereby allowing both OCT and EU products reciprocal 
customs duty-free access to their respective markets.9 The EU also provided 
development cooperation assistance to the OCTs.10 In other words, the EU-
OCT relationship included market access as well as economic assistance, the 
two components that still today constitute the main pillars of EU development 
cooperation policy.
From the outset, EU development cooperation policy was not intended to 
replace, but merely to supplement, the development cooperation policies of 
the Member States.11 However, not all the founding members of the European 
Union found it attractive to finance, via EU development cooperation 
assistance, what primarily were French colonies.12 Therefore, rather than 
financing such assistance through the European Union’s general budget, a 
special financing mechanism – called the European Development Fund 
6 Martin Holland, The european union and The Third World 25–27 (2002); Joseph A. McMahon, 
The developmenT Co-operaTion poliCy of The eC 31 (1998); and Halima Noor-Abdi, The lomé 
iv ConvenTion, The legal and SoCio-eConomiC aSpeCTS of afriCan, Caribbean and paCifiC 
STaTeS (aCp) and european CommuniTy (eC) CooperaTion 33–36 (1997).
7 Whereas today the “association” of a country with the European Union implies the prospect 
of future membership, the association provided for in Article 131 EEC did not carry with it 
such prospects.
8 See now Article 198 in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
9 Implementing Convention on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with 
the Community art. 9, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
10 Id. art. 1-7.
11 Id.  art. 1.
12 Lorand Bartels, The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union, 18 european 
Journal of inTernaTional laW 715, 718–719 (2007).
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(EDF) – was established in 1958 providing for a division of the Member 
States’ financing obligations which differed from those of the general budget. 
The first EDF was established for a limited period, and its budget was kept 
separate from the Union’s general budget. When the first EDF expired, it was 
followed by a time-limited second EDF, which in turn was replaced by a third 
EDF. And this has continued so that, today, a tenth EDF is in place and soon 
to be replaced by the 11th EDF.
De-colonisation, which primarily took place in the European Union’s early 
years, sparked demands for a redefinition of the relationship between the 
Union and the former colonies.13 As a consequence, the European Union 
and its Member States, together with the so-called Associated African 
and Malagasy Countries,14 entered into the First Yaoundé Convention of 
Association covering the period 1964–1969.15 This convention was to replace 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome as the legal framework governing the 
relationship between the two sides.16 When the First Yaoundé Convention 
expired the parties replaced it by a Second Yaoundé Convention, which 
covered the period 1971–1975.17 This convention-based regulation of the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the European Union and its Member 
States and, on the other hand, primarily former colonies in Africa has been 
maintained until today. Arguably, the main difference between the Treaty of 
Rome’s provisions on OCTs and the subsequent international agreements 
was that the former was designed to govern the Union’s relationship with 
dependent or “subordinate” territories, whereas, in principle, the international 
agreements were negotiated between equal and sovereign parties.18
Over the years, the successors to the First Yaoundé Convention have widened 
both the number of developing countries covered by the international 
agreements and the scope of the European Union’s cooperation with these 
developing countries so that, in addition to trade and development assistance, 
13 Martin Holland, The european union and The Third World 3 (2002).
14 Generally known under the French acronym EAMA.
15 Convention d’association entre la Communauté économique européenne et les États 
africains et malgache associés à cette Communauté, 1964 O.J. (P 93) 1431. 
16 For those overseas countries and territories that did not acquire independence, the Rome 
Treaty’s OCT provisions continued to apply.
17 Convention d’association entre la Communauté économique européenne et les États 
africains et malgache associés à cette Communauté, 1970 O.J. (L 282) 2. 
18 Halima Noor-Abdi, The lomé iv ConvenTion, The legal and SoCio-eConomiC aSpeCTS of 
afriCan, Caribbean and paCifiC STaTeS (aCp) and european CommuniTy (eC) CooperaTion 
41–42 (1997). 
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new policy fields were included in the framework of cooperation.19 Moreover, 
a new political dimension was introduced into the framework of EU 
development cooperation policy according to which respect for democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law was made an integral part of the Union’s 
relations with developing countries.20
With the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Union in 1986, 
Latin America and the non-European States bordering the Mediterranean 
received increased attention. Hence, the Union concluded broad development 
cooperation agreements with these countries, as well as with India, Pakistan, 
and the then five ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Moreover, with the political changes that swept 
through Central and Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980s, the 
European Union decided, inter alia, to direct considerable development funds 
to those neighbouring countries.
As is apparent from the above, the Rome Treaty did not establish a legal 
constitutional framework for a comprehensive, global approach to development 
policy. It was, geographically and thematically, incomplete, providing 
mainly for special economic relations with a number of primarily former 
French colonies (the OCTs). Outside this sphere, from a legal constitutional 
perspective, the “European area’s” development cooperation policy began 
to develop either as components of or supplements to other policies or 
outside the EU’s legal constitutional framework. Moreover, it developed in 
forms which were not foreseen in the constitutional framework set up with 
the Rome Treaty in 1958. Thus, as we shall see in section 2.2 below, at the 
Treaty-level, development cooperation appeared to be a component of other 
EU policies. Sometimes development cooperation policy formed a natural 
part of these other policies, whereas at other times it seemed to be at odds 
with or competing with these other policies. In particular, there were clashes 
between development cooperation and the basic principles of the Union’s 
common commercial policy – clashes which to a considerable extent were a 
reflection of the fact that the European Union at that time was an “Economic 
Community”, which had exclusive competence over the common commercial 
policy, whereas the competence over development cooperation policy was 
shared between the Union and the Member States. The incomplete and weak 
19 Including inter alia cultural cooperation, environmental protection, support for structural 
adjustment, and the question of debt relief.
20 Lorand Bartels, human righTS CondiTionaliTy in The eu’S inTernaTional agreemenTS 
13–15 (2005); see, for example, the preamble to the Third ACP-EEC Convention, 1986 
O.J. (L 86) 3 (also known as the Lomé III Convention), and art. 5 in the Fourth ACP-EEC 
Convention, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3 [hereinafter Lomé IV Convention].
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constitutional basis of the EU’s development cooperation policy in this period 
is clearly evident in the competence conflicts concerning the legal bases on 
which the EU should carry out its development cooperation policy.
1.2.2  The first competence conflict; development cooperation 
as a subordinate (or subsumed) policy
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Member States and the European 
Union21 jointly concluded a number of international commodity agreements. 
However, when in the mid-1970s an international agreement on rubber was 
negotiated, disagreement arose between the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers as to the question of competence. The agreement 
was negotiated within the framework of the United Nation’s Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and while there was no doubt 
that the negotiations concerned a trade agreement, it was equally clear 
that development cooperation formed a central component of it. It was not 
contested that the European Union was entitled to participate in the agreement 
envisaged; however, the Commission and the Council disagreed as to whether 
the agreement’s subject matter came entirely within the powers of the Union, 
or whether it possibly gave rise to a division of powers in such a way as to 
justify the joint participation in the agreement of both the Union and of the 
Member States. This prompted the Commission to ask the Court of Justice 
for an Opinion on the matter, which led to a ruling that became known as 
Natural Rubber Agreement.22
The Commission argued that the agreement envisaged came entirely, or 
at least in essentials, within the context of the provisions on the common 
commercial policy in the Rome Treaty,23 which meant that the negotiation 
and conclusion of the agreement came within the Union’s exclusive powers. 
In contrast, the Council held that the subject matter of the agreement fell 
outside the framework of the common commercial policy and thus called 
for a division of powers between the Union and the Member States so that 
the agreement would have to be concluded in accordance with the pattern of 
other similar so-called “mixed agreements”. Thus, the question was whether 
the Union’s (exclusive) competence in the area of common commercial policy 
was a sufficient legal basis for the conclusion of the Agreement, or whether 
the development cooperation policy aspects of the Agreement entailed that 
competence was shared between the Union and the Member States. 
21 Then the European Economic Community.
22 Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871. 
23 Then Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, now Article 207 TFEU.
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In its ruling, the Court of Justice held that the Treaty provisions on the 
common commercial policy also covered agreements where development 
cooperation policy played an important role. In this sense, development 
cooperation policy was considered to be subordinate to, or subsumed in, the 
exclusive common commercial policy. Hence, in principle, the European 
Union would have exclusive competence with regards to the negotiation and 
conclusion of the Natural Rubber Agreement, and these negotiations would 
have to be conducted within the decision-making framework of that policy. 
However, the Court added, to the extent that financing the machinery to be set 
up under the Natural Rubber Agreement were to be assumed by the Member 
States, this would mean that there would be a mixed agreement.
Subsequently, in its judgment in what has become known as the First GSP 
case from 1987, the Court of Justice confirmed that the common commercial 
policy took precedence over development cooperation policy.24 The First 
GSP case concerned the legality of two regulations whereby the European 
Union would offer access to the European market at preferential tariffs for 
certain products originating in developing countries. When the Commission 
originally proposed these regulations, they were based on the Treaty’s 
provisions on common commercial policy. However, before adopting the two 
regulations, the Council introduced an additional legal basis because, in its 
view, the regulations had development cooperation policy aims in addition 
to commercial policy aims. According to the Council, the implementation 
of development cooperation policy therefore went beyond the scope of the 
Treaty’s common commercial policy provision, and consequently necessitated 
recourse to what is sometimes referred to as the flexibility clause, which today 
we find in Article 352 TFEU.
The Court did not find in favour of the Council. It first observed that the 
link between trade and development cooperation had become progressively 
stronger in modern international relations, and that it was as part of this 
development that the European Union’s system of generalised preferences25 
was based. That system, the Court observed, reflected a new concept of 
international trade relations in which development cooperation aims played a 
major role. The Court, however, went on to observe that the Union’s common 
commercial policy should contribute “to the harmonious development of 
world trade”, which presupposed that commercial policy would be adjusted 
in order to take account of any changes of outlook in international relations. 
Likewise, other common commercial policy provisions provided not only 
24 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council (First GSP Case), 1987 E.C.R. 1493. 
25 So-called generalised system of preferences or GSP – hence the name of the case.
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for measures to be adopted by the institutions and for the conclusion of 
agreements with non-member countries, but also for common action “within 
the framework of international organizations of an economic character” – an 
expression which, according to the Court, was sufficiently broad to encompass 
the international organisations which might deal with commercial problems 
from a development cooperation policy point of view.
Referring to its earlier ruling in the Natural Rubber Agreement case, the 
Court went on to observe that “the existence of a link with development 
problems does not cause a measure to be excluded from the sphere of the 
common commercial policy as defined by the Treaty”, that “it would no 
longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile common commercial policy if 
the [Union] were not in a position to avail itself also of means of action going 
beyond instruments intended to have an effect only on the traditional aspects 
of external trade”, and that “[a] ‘commercial policy’ understood in that 
sense would be destined to become nugatory in the course of time”. On this 
basis, the Court of Justice ruled that the contested regulations were measures 
falling within the sphere of the common commercial policy, and that since 
the Council had the power to adopt them pursuant to the Treaty’s provisions 
on the common commercial policy, the Council was not justified in adding 
as legal basis what is now found in Article 352 TFEU. Arguably, the Court of 
Justice’s rulings in the Natural Rubber Agreement case and the First GSP case 
suggest, we submit, that development cooperation policy was considered to 
be subordinate to, or subsumed in, the common commercial policy. 
1.2.3  European Parliament competences circumscribed; 
development policy competence as a complementary 
competence
Whilst, on the face of it, the Natural Rubber Agreement and First GSP 
cases merely concerned the somewhat technical question of whether or not 
development cooperation policy was subordinate to the common commercial 
policy, with regards to substance the Court of Justice’s answer to this 
question had an immediate impact on the division of competence between 
the European Union and the Member States: If the development cooperation 
policy was subordinate, the European Union had exclusive competence, but 
if development cooperation policy was not subordinate, the Member States 
would retain some competence. Hence, in reality, the two cases also reflected 
a competence battle between the Commission and the Member States (the 
Council). As we shall see immediately below, this vertical competence battle 
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was also apparent in two other cases which concerned the legal situation prior 
to the Maastricht Treaty.26
The first of the two cases, normally referred to as the Emergency Aid 
for Bangladesh case,27 concerned the provision of humanitarian aid to 
Bangladesh. The background to the case was the devastating effects left 
by a cyclone that hit Bangladesh in April 1991. The Commission made an 
immediate grant of aid to Bangladesh and prepared a plan for further special 
aid to the country. The Commission put this plan forward to the Council, but 
the plan never appeared on the formal agenda of a regular Council meeting. 
On 14 May 1991, at a working lunch, the ministers for foreign affairs decided 
to provide special aid as proposed by the Commission. The Member States 
could provide this aid either directly or via the Commission, and all but one 
granted it directly to Bangladesh.
In proceedings brought against the Council and the Commission, respectively, 
the European Parliament challenged the ministers for foreign affairs’ 
decision, arguing that the two institutions had infringed the Parliament’s 
prerogatives in budgetary matters. The Court of Justice found against the 
Parliament. In particular, it pointed out that the European Union did not have 
exclusive competence in the field of humanitarian aid, and that, consequently, 
the Member States were not precluded from exercising their competence in 
that regard collectively in the Council or outside it.28 Since the Union did 
not have exclusive competence, the Parliament could only challenge the 
decision if it were an act of a Union institution. Following an examination of 
the circumstances in which the decision had been taken, the Court of Justice 
concluded that the contested act was not an act of the Council, but an act 
taken by the Member States collectively. This led the Court to declare the 
Parliament’s application against the Council to be inadmissible.29
It is noteworthy that to a considerable extent both Advocate General Jacobs 
and the Court of Justice based their respective reasoning upon the view that 
in the field of humanitarian aid the European Union did not have exclusive 
competence. The Advocate General went on to observe that the Union held 
26 Even though one of the rulings (Lomé IV) was only rendered after the entry into force of that 
Treaty.
27 Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, European Parliament v. Council and Commission 
(Emergency Aid for Bangladesh), 1993 E.C.R. I-3685.
28 Para. 16 of the judgment.
29 Para. 25 of the judgment. The Court also rendered the action brought against the Commission 
inadmissible, since the Member State contributions did not qualify as items of Union revenue 
and the expenditure relating thereto did not constitute expenditure of the Union.
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concurrent competence with that of the Member States,30 whereas the Court 
abstained from expressly qualifying the competence, even though, presumably, 
it shared the view of its Advocate General.31 The Court’s hesitation may be 
due to the fact that it was far from obvious that the European Union had the 
necessary legal basis for providing humanitarian aid.32 The Emergency Aid for 
Bangladesh case, though formally a (horizontal competence) dispute between 
the institutions, concerned also the (vertical) demarcation line between the 
Union and the Member States in respect of financing humanitarian aid. The 
Court firmly established that the Parliament’s budgetary powers could not be 
used to restrain the Member States’ capability to provide humanitarian aid 
outside the Union framework.
In 1994 the Emergency Aid for Bangladesh ruling was followed by the Court 
of Justice’s ruling in the Lomé IV case brought by the European Parliament 
against the Council.33 Again, the European Parliament based its legal challenge 
on the view that its prerogatives in the field of EU budgetary procedures had 
been infringed. The case concerned the financing of the Lomé IV Convention 
between, on the one hand, the European Union and its Member States and, 
on the other hand, a large number of developing countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP countries). The Lomé Convention was first 
of all an instrument for development of the ACP countries, and the financing 
was made via a special fund known as the Seventh European Development 
Fund (7th EDF). These successive EDFs formed (and continue to form) a 
peculiar hybrid. They are financed by the Member States out of their 
national budgets and do not form part of the European Union’s budget, but 
they are managed by the European Commission on the basis of a financial 
regulation adopted by the Council.34 The European Parliament claimed that, 
in the framework of development finance cooperation, it followed from the 
very words of the Lomé Convention that the European Union as such had 
30 Para. 25 of the Advocate General’s Opinion.
31 Para. 16 of the judgment.
32 See Morten Broberg, Undue Assistance?: An Analysis of the Legal Basis of Regulation 
1257/96 Concerning Humanitarian Aid, 34 european laW revieW 769 (2009); Piet 
Eeckhout, eu exTernal relaTionS laW 128–129 (2nd ed. 2011); Alan Dashwood, External 
Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, in legal iSSueS of The amSTerdam TreaTy 
223, (O’Keeffe & Twomey eds., 1999); and Joseph H. H. Weiler, The ConSTiTuTion 
of europe, do The neW CloTheS have an emperor?, and oTher eSSayS on european 
inTegraTion 54 n. 117 (1999). It may be added that if the Court of Justice had held that 
there was no legal basis for providing humanitarian aid this would have meant that the 
Commission’s immediate grant of aid to Bangladesh would have been unlawful.
33 Case C-316/91, European Parliament v. Council (Lomé IV), 1994 E.C.R. I-653. The case is 
also sometimes referred to as the European Development Fund case or the EDF case.
34 On the background to the EDF scheme, see above section 2.1.
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undertaken vis-à-vis the ACP States an obligation of international law distinct 
from those undertaken by the Member States. Consequently, in the view of 
the European Parliament, the financial resources to be granted constituted 
Union expenditure which had to be shown in the Union budget and which was 
subject to the Treaty provisions concerning its implementation.
The Court of Justice did not accept the European Parliament’s argument. 
Rather, it observed that the Union’s competence in the field of development 
cooperation assistance was not exclusive.35 Accordingly, the Member States 
were entitled to enter into commitments themselves vis-à-vis non-Member 
States, either collectively or individually, or even jointly with the European 
Union. Since the European Union did not have exclusive competence, 
and since the obligation to grant financial assistance under the Lomé IV 
Convention fell on the Union and its Member States, considered together, the 
competence to implement the Union’s financial assistance provided for under 
the Lomé Convention was shared by the Union and its Member States. Thus, 
it was for them to choose the source and methods of financing. It followed that 
the expenditure necessary for the Union’s financial assistance provided for in 
the Convention was assumed directly by the Member States and distributed 
by the Seventh EDF which they had set up by mutual agreement. The Union 
institutions were merely associated with the administration of the Fund, by 
virtue of that agreement. Consequently, the Court ruled that that expenditure 
was not Union expenditure which had to be entered in the Union budget and 
governed by the Treaty provisions on the budget.36
The Court of Justice’s ruling in Lomé IV closely mirrors its previous ruling 
in Emergency Aid for Bangladesh, albeit Lomé IV primarily concerned 
development cooperation policy, whereas Emergency Aid for Bangladesh 
concerned humanitarian aid.37 Both cases concerned inter-institutional battles 
in the budgetary field. However, the cases were at least as important from the 
perspective of the Member States, since, in effect, the European Parliament in 
these cases attempted to expand or alter the nature of the Union’s competence 
in the field of development cooperation by restraining the Member States’ 
competences to financing development cooperation. In both cases the Court 
of Justice found that there was “concurrent competence”, and therefore 
35 Paras 26 and 34. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the case at para. 40.
36 It may be noted that in the Lomé IV case the Spanish Government invoked the Treaty regulation 
as it appeared after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. after the material time of 
the proceedings. The Court of Justice apparently accepted the Spanish argument, cf. para. 27 of 
the ruling.
37 Contrast with the Opinion by Advocate General Jacobs at para. 41. The Advocate General held 
that the Lomé IV case concerned development cooperation policy as well as humanitarian aid.
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the Union and the Member States had a rather wide margin of discretion 
as regards the preferred division of tasks, including also the possibility of 
creating hybrid budgetary arrangements.38 Since, in the field of development 
cooperation, financing plays a key role, the Court’s rulings in both cases 
were important in order to ensure that Member States retained real shared 
development cooperation policy competence, which was not subsequently 
circumvented by the Parliament’s budgetary powers.
To sum up, in this founding period of the Union’s legal constitutional 
framework for development cooperation policy the following picture 
emerges: Leaving aside the special provisions on the OCTs, in large part the 
legal framework for the Union’s development cooperation policy was left for 
the Court of Justice to define. During this period, the Court largely supported 
the Commission’s approach with regard to the place and importance of 
development cooperation policy in the EU constitutional system. First, the 
Court accepted that the common commercial policy, the Union’s predominant 
external policy at the time, could be broadly construed, and thus used to pursue 
development cooperation policy objectives. In this way, important aspects of 
development cooperation policy were brought within the Union’s exclusive 
competence. Arguably, the legal constitutional framework established in this 
case law created a trade-biased foundation for the Union’s and the Member 
States’ development cooperation policy. Secondly, outside this field, the 
Union’s development cooperation policy competence was weak. Attempts by 
the European Parliament to gain influence through its budgetary prerogatives 
were not supported by the Commission and failed when the Court firmly 
rejected to expand the concurrent nature of the Union’s development 
cooperation policy competence through the Parliament’s budgetary powers.
38 It may be noted that in subsequent judgments the Court of Justice has provided an interpretation 
of the duty of loyal cooperation with particular regard to the international representation of the 
Union and its Member States that arguably places some rather irksome fetters on Member States’ 
room for manoeuvre in an international context. See in particular Case C-246/07, Commission v. 
Sweden (the perfluoroctane sulfonate or ”PFOS” case), 2010 E.C.R. I-3317, at paras 69–105.
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2 Maastricht to Lisbon
2.1 Overview
A second phase for the legal constitutional framework of the European Union’s 
development cooperation policy began in 1993 with the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced a specific Title on development 
cooperation in the EC Treaty.39 Arguably, this constitutes the most important 
change at the constitutional level in the field of EU development cooperation 
policy since 1957 and until this day. The new Treaty provisions were based 
on three legs – often referred to as the three C’s – laying down the principles, 
inter alia, for how the European Union and the Member States were to 
cooperate in the field of development cooperation. We consider these below 
in section 2.2. The second phase also witnessed a number of conflicts over the 
precise delimitation of the European Union’s development cooperation policy 
vis-à-vis other policies. This issue will be analysed in section 2.3. Finally, the 
“cohabitation” between development cooperation and the European Union’s 
values (in particular, human rights and democracy) was brought up in some 
important cases which we examine in section 2.4.
2.2  Elevating EU development cooperation policy to the 
constitutional level
The Maastricht Treaty’s introduction of a completely new Title on development 
cooperation in the EC Treaty provided a constitutional basis for the European 
Union’s development cooperation policy. According to the new provisions, 
the objectives of the Union’s policy in the field were the sustainable economic 
and social development of the developing countries; their smooth and gradual 
integration into the world economy; the campaign against poverty; and the 
promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.40 The new Title 
on development cooperation also expressly vested in the European Union 
Treaty-making competence in the field.41
39 Title XX of the EC Treaty, entitled “Development Cooperation”.
40 Article 177(1) and (2) EC.
41 Cf. Article 181 EC (that partly corresponds to Article 211 TFEU). Article 181 EC read as 
follows: “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member 
States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organizations. 
The arrangements for Community cooperation may be the subject of agreements between 
the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in 
accordance with Article 300.” And it went on to state: “The previous paragraph shall be without 
prejudice to Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements.” In the Declaration on articles 109, 130R and 130Y of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 100, the signatories observed: “The 
Conference considers that the provisions of […] and Article [181] do not affect the principles 
resulting from the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice in the AETR case.”
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As mentioned in section 2.1 above, the “new” policy rested on three legs (the 
so-called “three Cs”), namely:
• that the Union’s policy vis-à-vis developing countries respectively other 
Union policies must be coherent,
• that the European Union and the Member States are obliged to 
coordinate their efforts in the field of development cooperation, and
• that European Union development cooperation policy must be 
complementary to the development policies of the Member States.
The requirement in what was then Article 178 EC that there must be coherence 
between the Union’s policy towards developing countries and other Union 
policies was phrased in the following terms:
“The Community shall take account of the objectives [that it is required 
to pursue in the sphere of development cooperation], in the policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.”
This obligation arguably also found support in Article 3 EU which, inter alia, 
provided:
“The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external 
activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, 
economic and development policies.”
Even though the duty of coherence between development cooperation policy 
and other policies was introduced at the Treaty-level, it is difficult to identify 
any substantive legal effects flowing from this obligation.42 Amongst the 
questions that even today remain unanswered regarding the construction of 
the principle of coherence is whether the duty is a legally enforceable one, and 
whether it exclusively weighs on the European Union in its various policies 
vis-à-vis its development cooperation policy, or whether, when read in 
conjunction with the duty of loyal cooperation, it also weighs on the Member 
States in their policies vis-à-vis European development cooperation policies. 
42 See, however, Case C-155/07, European Parliament v. Council (European Investment Bank), 
2008 E.C.R. I-8103, at para. 46. See also Morten Broberg, Preventing Incoherence Between 
New EU Legislation and EU Development Policy, DIIS Comment (2009), available at  
http://diis.dk/sw86797.asp. 
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With respect to the second C – that the European Union and the Member 
States were under an obligation to coordinate their policies in the field of 
development cooperation – Article 180(1) EC provided as follows:
“The Community and the Member States shall coordinate their 
policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on 
their aid programmes, including in international organisations and 
during international conferences. …”43
The duty to coordinate necessarily presupposed that both Member States and 
the European Union had competence in the field of development cooperation.44 
However, the duty to coordinate also implied that there were limits to the 
Member States’ and the Union’s exercise of their respective competence in 
the area.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the competence of 
the European Union in the field of development cooperation had to be 
complementary45 to that of the Member States – i.e. the third C – would appear 
to have two consequences: Firstly, it codified the Court of Justice’s implicit 
findings in Emergency Aid for Bangladesh and Lomé IV that Member States 
and the European Union hold concurrent competences. Secondly, according 
to its wording, it implied that the European Union was under an obligation 
to take due account of the development cooperation policies of the Member 
States in its pursuance of its own development cooperation policy, thus 
perhaps even reinforcing the Member States’ room for manoeuvre, which 
was already apparent in the two judgments.46
The latter of the two consequences is of particular interest – at least from a 
theoretical point of view: Essentially, the wording of the Maastricht Treaty 
made it clear that whilst both the European Union and the Member States had 
43 The duty of donors of development cooperation assistance to cooperate is now also laid 
down in the so-called Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, see The Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, oeCd, (2005/2008), http://www.oecd.
org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf, at para. 32. 
44 This is also apparent from Article 181(1) EC which provided that “[w]ithin their respective 
spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States …”
45 The complementarity requirement is now also reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness where the signatories (including amongst others both EU Member States 
and the European Commission) have undertaken to pursue more effective development 
cooperation policies through (inter alia) complementarity in the field (see para. 35 of the 
Declaration).
46 The complementarity requirement in Article 177 EC was phrased as follows: “Community 
policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the 
policies pursued by the Member States, …”
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competence in the field of development cooperation, the latter’s competence 
took priority over that of the former. In other words, Article 177 EC required 
the European Union to give “right of way” to the Member States in cases 
of overlap between their respective development cooperation policies.47 
Nevertheless, in practice the provision does not appear to have had a 
substantial impact; and, as we shall see below, the wording has been amended 
with the Lisbon Treaty. Perhaps the best way of translating the Maastricht 
Treaty’s complementarity obligation into “competence lingo” is by qualifying 
it as a type of shared competence where the principle of pre-emption does 
not apply.48
2.3 Defining and delimiting EU development cooperation policy
In section 2.2 above, we have seen that during the first phase of EU 
development cooperation policy there were tensions between, on the one hand, 
the European Union’s common commercial policy and, on the other hand, the 
Union’s development cooperation policy. Given the original constitutional 
set-up, the latter proved to be the weaker of these two policies. After the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the question was how the Court of Justice 
would interpret the new definition – and delimitation – of EU development 
cooperation policy. In particular, would its place and importance vis-à-vis 
other policies, including notably the common commercial policy, be altered 
now that it had been given its own Title and with a more general geographical 
and thematic reach? In this section, we examine how the Court in its case 
law defined and delimited these new EU development cooperation policy 
competences during the second phase.
The basis for the Court of Justice’s “new” definition of development 
cooperation policy was laid in the so-called India Agreement case: In 1994 the 
Council adopted a decision concerning the conclusion of the “Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on 
Partnership and Development”. The decision was jointly based on the Treaty 
provisions on common commercial policy and on development cooperation. 
Portugal, however, argued that the legal basis of the contested decision did 
not confer on the European Union the necessary powers to conclude the 
47 In Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council (India Agreement), 1996 E.C.R. I-6177, Advocate 
General La Pergola at paras 15–18 argued that the wording of Article 177 EC should not be 
interpreted so as to render European Union competence complementary (i.e. subordinate) to 
that of the Member States. Instead, he held that none of these took precedence over the other. 
However, in its judgment, the Court of Justice did not engage in an analysis of this question.
48 On the reasons behind this delimitation of competence, see Marise Cremona, External 
Relations and External Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated 
Policy, in The evoluTion of eu laW 252–253, (Craig & de Búrca eds., 2011).
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Agreement as regards inter alia a number of provisions relating to various 
specific fields of cooperation.49 It therefore challenged the decision, arguing 
that it should also have been based on what today is Article 352 TFEU,50 
and that all Member States should have taken part in the conclusion of the 
Agreement.51
According to the Portuguese government, the fact that the India Agreement 
included provisions relating to energy, tourism, culture, drug abuse control, and 
intellectual property meant that the Council could not base its decision merely 
on the Treaty provisions on common commercial policy and development 
cooperation. The Court of Justice rejected the Portuguese claims, finding that 
the European Union’s competence in the field of development cooperation 
provided a sufficient legal basis for adopting the contested provisions of the 
Agreement with India. In other words, the Court found that the Treaty Title 
on development cooperation policy could be given a rather broad scope. 
Some have pointed out that the Court of Justice feared that this extensive 
interpretation of the Treaty Title on development cooperation could lead to 
circumvention of the Treaty-based limits on the European Union’s powers.52 
Even if the Court did entertain such doubts, it nevertheless opted for a broad 
construction of the notion of EU development cooperation policy.53 In this 
regard, it is worth noticing that whilst the contested Council decision was 
based upon the Treaty provision on common commercial policy as well as 
the Treaty provision on development cooperation, the Court of Justice only 
made reference to the latter when finding the decision to be lawful. Indeed, it 
49 As well as with regards to the Agreement’s provision relating to human rights. We deal with 
this issue in section 2.4 below.
50 The so-called flexibility provision which requires unanimity amongst all members of the 
Council.
51 For a general examination of the ruling’s impact upon the European Union’s development 
policy, see Steve Peers, Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s Development Policy?: 
The Impact of Portugal v. Council, in The general laW of e.C. exTernal relaTionS 
(Dashwood & Hillion eds., 2000).
52 Piet Eeckhout, eu exTernal relaTionS laW 136 (2nd ed. 2011). See also Marise Cremona, 
External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in 
The evoluTion of eu laW 161, (Craig & de Búrca eds., 1999).
53 The Court’s judgment of 11 June 2014 in Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council (re the 
Philippine PCFA) (nyr), on the proper legal basis for the Council decision on the signing 
of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Republic of the 
Philippines, confirms both the importance of the India Agreement case and, more generally, 
the broad construction of the notion of development cooperation post-Lisbon, cf. further 
below, section 3.2.2.2. Contrast, however, with Piet Eeckhout, eu exTernal relaTionS laW 
(2nd ed. 2011), who at p. 136 observes: “… Even if the Court did not accept Portugal’s 
claims, it may have been too restrictive in its analysis, putting up high constitutional hurdles 
for an effective Community development co-operation policy”. The same author at p. 140 
characterises the Court’s approach as “rather restrictive”.
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is possible that the decision could have been taken solely on the basis of the 
Union’s competence in the field of development cooperation policy.54
Arguably, the ruling in the India Agreement case signalled that the Court of 
Justice took seriously that development cooperation policy had been given 
its own Chapter and power-conferring provisions with the Maastricht Treaty 
and was therefore now entitled to its own “space” and raison d’être. Whilst 
in the earlier cases of Natural Rubber Agreement55 and First GSP56 the 
Court treated development cooperation policy as a component of, and thus 
subordinate to, the common commercial policy, in the India Agreement case, 
development cooperation policy was treated as a multi-facetted new policy 
encompassing a broad range of areas that would normally be considered to 
constitute separate policies. Inevitably, in light of the changes made by the 
Maastricht Treaty, with the India Agreement case, the classic dilemma in the 
Court of Justice’s case law on choice of legal basis was imported into the new 
and independent policy field of development cooperation: On the one hand, 
the Union legislator must be careful not to stretch too far the requirement 
that a specific legal basis must be included merely because a legal measure 
encompasses a field covered by that measure in a situation where, as in the 
India Agreement case, this area is merely incidental to the overall objective of 
the measure (in casu development cooperation). On the other hand, the Union 
legislator must respect the principle of conferral and cannot stretch a multi-
facetted competence provision (such as that on development cooperation) so 
far that it twists specific decision-making procedures and empties the Treaty’s 
specific power-conferring provisions of substance. The India Agreement case 
confirms that the Maastricht Treaty entailed a methodological shift in the legal 
definition of the Union’s development cooperation policy. A consequence of 
the Court of Justice’s broad interpretation in the India Agreement case of 
development cooperation policy with regard to competence was that Member 
States were deprived of the possibility of individually vetoing this kind of 
measure. This potentially boosted the effectiveness of the European Union’s 
possibilities of legislating in the field of development cooperation.
Another step in the definition of the European Union’s development 
cooperation policy during the second phase was initiated by the Treaty of 
54 Portugal raised the question whether the Council decision could have been made without 
referring to what is now Article 207 TFEU on common commercial policy. However, the 
Court of Justice at paras 78–79 declined to answer this question.
55 Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871.
56 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council (First GSP Case), 1987 E.C.R. 1493.
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Nice’s57 introduction of Article 181a EC in 2003. Article 181a EC formed a 
completely new Title XXI on Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation 
with Third Countries of the EC Treaty, which followed immediately after Title 
XX on development cooperation.58 As is apparent from the Title itself, the 
new provision granted the European Union specific powers to adopt measures 
concerning economic, financial, and technical cooperation with third 
countries so that recourse to what is now Article 352 TFEU (the flexibility 
provision) for adopting such measures would no longer be necessary.
In principle, most – if not all – development cooperation measures may be 
qualified as economic, financial or technical cooperation with third countries. 
The introduction of Title XXI (with Article 181a EC as its sole provision) as 
an adjacent legal basis to that on development cooperation would therefore 
seem to intrude on the area that prior to the Nice Treaty was covered by the EC 
Treaty’s Title XX on development cooperation. Moreover, whilst the adoption 
of legal measures under Title XX required the use of the so-called co-decision 
procedure where the European Parliament was given substantive powers,59 the 
Parliament did not have similar powers under the then new Article 181a EC. 
Therefore, to base a legal measure upon Title XXI rather than Title XX would 
have a direct impact on the European Parliament’s powers with regards to the 
measure (and thus on the European Union’s institutional power balance).
This conflict between Titles XX and XXI came to the fore in the European 
Investment Bank case.60 The European Investment Bank case concerned the 
European Parliament’s action for annulment of a Council decision granting a 
European Union guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses 
under loans and loan guarantees for projects outside the European Union 
involving both developing countries and other third countries. The Council 
adopted this decision solely on the basis of Article 181a EC. The European 
Parliament’s challenge was essentially based upon the argument that the 
Union guarantee – at least partly – concerned development cooperation 
projects, and that the decision therefore also should have been based on the 
Treaty Title on development cooperation. If such dual legal basis had been 
57 Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 
[hereinafter Nice Treaty].
58 According to Piet Eeckhout, eu exTernal relaTionS laW 140 (2nd ed. 2011), the Court of 
Justice’s ruling in the India Agreement “may have been one of the causes of the insertion into 
the EC Treaty” of Article 181a EC.
59 Article 251 EC.
60 Case C-155/07, European Parliament v. Council (European Investment Bank), 2008 E.C.R. 
I-8103.
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used, the Parliament would have been a co-decider. The Council counter-
argued that the term “third countries” used in Article 181a EC in connection 
with economic, financial, and technical cooperation with such countries was 
sufficiently wide to encompass both developing countries and other third 
countries, and so the legal basis was correct.61
The Court of Justice did not agree with the Council. Rather, it observed 
that to follow the Council’s line of argument that all economic, financial, 
and technical cooperation measures with developing countries could be 
undertaken on the sole basis of Article 181a EC would imply a restriction 
on the scope of the EC Treaty’s Title XX on development cooperation. The 
Court went on to consider the precise wording of Article 181a EC which in 
its section 1, first subsection, provided as follows:
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, and in 
particular those of Title XX,62 the Community shall carry out, within its 
spheres of competence, economic, financial and technical cooperation 
measures with third countries. Such measures shall be complementary 
to those carried out by the Member States and consistent with the 
development policy of the Community.”63
By making a close comparison between both the wording and the legal history 
behind Titles XX and XXI of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice concluded 
that, since Title XXI’s Article 181a EC was to apply without prejudice to Title 
XX, this provision was not intended to constitute the legal basis for measures 
pursuing the objectives of development cooperation within the meaning of 
the latter Title.64 The Court then considered on what legal basis the contested 
decision could (and should) have been taken. It observed that the decision 
had two components, one of which concerned development cooperation 
falling under Title XX of the EC Treaty, while the other concerned economic, 
61 Under Article 179 EC on development cooperation, the European Parliament would have co-
decision powers, whereas under Article 181a EC the Parliament would merely have the right 
to be heard. 
62 Title XX on development cooperation.
63 Emphasis added.
64 The Court of Justice in paras 52–54 of the judgment also ruled that the concept of “developing 
country” must be given an autonomous EU interpretation. And it added that that was equally 
true in view also of the dynamic nature of the developing country category, in the sense that it 
was liable to evolve in response to events which were difficult to predict. This notwithstanding, 
in the actual case the Court considered it to be sufficient to point out that it was common 
ground that a significant number of countries appearing in the list of eligible countries annexed 
to the contested decision were capable of falling within that concept, whatever its precise 
definition. See also Advocate General Kokott at para. 45 in her Opinion in the case.
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financial, and technical cooperation with third countries other than developing 
countries, falling under Title XXI of the same Treaty. Those two components 
were inseparably linked, without it being possible to identify a main or 
predominant aim or component. The Court of Justice, however, also found 
that the procedures respectively laid down in the two different Titles could not 
be classed as incompatible. It therefore concluded that the contested decision 
should have been founded, exceptionally, on the dual legal basis of Titles XX 
(Article 179 EC) and XXI (Article 181a EC).65 Since the decision had been 
based on Title XXI alone it was annulled.
With the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and the pillar structure, a 
new demarcation line arose between, on the one hand, those matters such as 
development cooperation policy that fell under the first pillar (the Community 
pillar) and, on the other hand, other matters that fell under the two other pillars 
(the Union pillars). For EU development cooperation policy, this demarcation 
line was the subject of the Court of Justice’s ruling in the ECOWAS case.66 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union’s Treaty 
system was based on three pillars. Whilst pillar one concerned what was 
referred to as Community matters (i.e. matters falling under the EC Treaty), 
pillar two concerned the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as 
regulated by the EU Treaty, whereas pillar three concerned those matters on 
Justice and Home Affairs that fell under the EU Treaty. Competences and 
procedures differed considerably between these three pillars, meaning that 
it had wide-ranging consequences if a legal measure was adopted under one 
pillar rather than under another.
The ECOWAS case concerned the Council’s adoption of a decision concerning 
a European Union contribution to the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons. This decision found its legal basis within the CFSP (the second 
pillar). The Commission (subsequently joined by the European Parliament) 
challenged the Council decision, as well as a Council Joint Action, before 
the Court of Justice arguing that the contribution did not only concern CFSP 
matters under the second pillar, but also came within the EC Treaty’s Title 
on development cooperation (the first pillar). In order to decide the case, the 
 
65 See in this respect Bernd Martenzuk, Cooperation with Developing and Other Third 
Countries: Elements of a Community Foreign Policy, in exTernal eConomiC relaTionS and 
foreign poliCy in The european union 408, (Griller & Weidel eds., 2002).
66 Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council (ECOWAS), 2008 E.C.R. I-3651. The ECOWAS case 
is sometimes also referred to as the Small Arms and Light Weapons case, the Small Arms 
case, or merely the SALW case.
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Court of Justice therefore had to establish the delimitation between the CFSP 
and development cooperation.
In this regard, the Court first laid down that the European Union’s 
development cooperation policy was not limited to measures directly related 
to the campaign against poverty. Nevertheless, in order for a measure to fall 
within this policy it must contribute to the pursuit of the policy’s economic 
and social development objectives.67 With particular regard to the actual case 
before it, the Court of Justice observed:
“… it is apparent from a number of documents emanating from the 
Union institutions and from the European Council that certain measures 
aiming to prevent fragility in developing countries, including those 
adopted in order to combat the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons, can contribute to the elimination or reduction of obstacles to 
the economic and social development of those countries”.68
And it continued:
“Nevertheless, a concrete measure aiming to combat the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons may be adopted by the Community 
under its development cooperation policy only if that measure, by 
virtue both of its aim and its content, falls within the scope of the 
competences conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community in that 
field … That is not the case if such a measure, even if it contributes to 
the economic and social development of the developing country, has 
as its main purpose the implementation of the CFSP.”69
In the actual case, however, the Court of Justice found that the aim and 
content of the contested decision had two components, neither of which could 
be considered to be incidental to the other: one falling within Community 
development cooperation policy and the other within the CFSP.70 Since the 
applicable Treaties precluded the Union from adopting, on the basis of the 
EU Treaty, a measure which could properly be adopted on the basis of the 
EC Treaty, the Union could not have recourse to a legal basis falling within 
the CFSP in order to adopt provisions which also fell within a competence 
67 Para. 67 of the judgment.
68 Para. 68 of the judgment.
69 Paras 71–72 of the judgment.
70 Paras 76–76 and 108 of the judgment. Contrast this with the Opinion of the Advocate 
General at paras 211–213.
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conferred on the Union (at the material time “the Community”) by the EC 
Treaty (i.e. the first pillar).71 Therefore, the Court of Justice annulled the 
contested decision.
In sum, during this second phase, the nature of the competence conflicts 
(both inter-institutional and between the Union and the Member States) 
changed. The new Title on development cooperation policy, which contained 
its own power-conferring provisions, changed the discourse: In the second 
phase, the main question was no longer how much development cooperation 
policy could be pursued (subsumed) within the framework of other power-
conferring provisions, such as ex Article 113 (Common Commercial Policy) 
and ex Article 235 (the “flexibility provision”). After the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty, it became less important whether a sustainable notion 
of international trade relations could embrace development cooperation 
policy aspects (as was the question in Opinion 1/78 on the Natural Rubber 
Agreement). Rather, in this second phase the most important question was 
how much could be done within the framework of the new and multi-facetted 
development cooperation policy. The India Agreement case, the European 
Investment Bank case, and the ECOWAS case show that this shift in focus 
created new legal complications:72 When a new independent Community 
(first pillar) policy arrives with new competences, the Union must find space 
for this policy, sometimes to the detriment of the scope of other (existing) 
Community (first pillar) policies and other (second and third pillar) Union 
policies.73 
In a way, the Court’s case law concerning the second phase marks a new 
and more sophisticated approach to the Union’s development cooperation 
policy competence. Whereas during the first phase development cooperation 
appeared to be a subordinate (subsumed) policy – at least vis-à-vis the 
common commercial policy – the balance shifted during the second phase 
where development cooperation was put on an equal footing with other 
first pillar policies and in front of CFSP (second pillar) measures. It may 
71 Para. 77 of the judgment.
72 Christophe Hillion & Ramses A. Wessel, Competence Distribution in EU External Relations 
after ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?, 46 Common mkT. l. rev. 551, 
579 (2009), point out that the Court of Justice’s wide definition of the EU development 
cooperation policy did not “ipso facto entail more Community international presence in the 
field”, and that what looked like “a victory for the Commission, and for the Community 
method, might turn out to be a pyrrhic victory”.
73 In the European Investment Bank case the Court of Justice observed that the situation is 
different when a new Union policy is introduced with power-conferring provisions, which 
explicitly provide that they apply without prejudice to other Treaty provisions, such as 
Article 181a, cf. paras 39–45 and 47.
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be recalled that, in section 2.2 above, we noted that during the first phase 
the Member States invoked development cooperation policy aspects as 
a means of retaining their own competence vis-à-vis the Commission, cf. 
e.g. the Natural Rubber Agreement Opinion. During the second phase, the 
roles had been reversed so that the Commission and the Parliament now 
had an interest in invoking development cooperation policy provisions as 
the legal basis. Member States wishing a say over how the Union and, by 
implication, themselves, cooperate with third countries (as was the case when 
Portugal challenged the Cooperation Agreement with India) no longer had 
an interest in supporting a broad notion of development cooperation policy. 
The importance of this structural change should not be underestimated. In 
particular, it may have created a fertile environment for a more multi-facetted 
development cooperation policy, which gradually became more independent 
from the Union’s other policies, including notably the policy on the Overseas 
Countries and Territories, the Common Commercial Policy, and the CFSP.
2.4  Promotion of European values as part of EU development 
cooperation policy
The end of the cold war – most clearly symbolised by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 – led to a remarkable shift in the international power balance, 
leaving the United States of America as the only superpower and allowing the 
European Union much more room to pursue a foreign policy of its own. The 
European Union to a considerable extent used this to focus on the promotion of 
”European values”, and this is particularly clear in the Union’s development 
cooperation policy.74 One of the instruments used by the European Union in 
its furtherance of its values was to include so-called human rights clauses in 
agreements with third countries,75 or, as the European Council explained in 
its 1991 resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development:
74 See Morten Broberg, From Colonial Power to Human Rights Promotor: On the Legal 
Regulation of the European Union’s Relations with the Developing Countries, 26 Cambridge 
revieW of inTernaTional affairS 675 (2013).
75 See, generally, Lorand Bartels, human righTS CondiTionaliTy in The eu’S inTernaTional 
agreemenTS (2005); and Steve Peers, Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s 
Development Policy?: The Impact of Portugal v. Council, in The general laW of e.C. 
exTernal relaTionS (Dashwood & Hillion eds., 2000). 
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“The Community and its Member States will explicitly introduce the 
consideration of human rights as an element of their relations with 
developing countries; human rights clauses will be inserted in future 
cooperation agreements.”76
Moreover, the European Union soon decided that these human rights clauses 
should be qualified as “an essential element” of the agreement which they 
formed part of. The reason for this was somewhat legal-technical, since the 
Union (or rather, the Commission) drew inspiration from Article 60(1) and (3) 
of the Vienna Convention,77 which provides that “the violation of a provision 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose” of an international 
agreement (a Treaty) constitutes a material breach of that agreement (Treaty) 
and that “[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties 
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty 
or suspending its operation in whole or in part”. In other words, the 1991 
European Council resolution obliged the European Union to introduce human 
rights clauses in cooperation agreements with the developing countries. And 
such clauses would explicitly be characterised as “essential elements” in 
order to provide the European Union with some efficient sanctioning powers 
vis-à-vis the other contracting party (i.e. vis-à-vis the developing country or 
countries) if the latter should breach the human rights clause.
In section 2.3 above, we have seen that in the India Agreement case Portugal 
challenged the Agreement’s legal bases (development cooperation policy 
and common commercial policy) vis-à-vis a number of topics covered by 
the Agreement. However, Portugal also challenged the Agreement’s inclusion 
of a human rights clause. With regard to the human rights clause, Portugal 
observed that Article 1(1) of the Agreement provided that “[r]respect for 
human rights and democratic principles is the basis for the cooperation 
between the Contracting Parties and for the provisions of this Agreement, and 
it constitutes an essential element of the Agreement.” In this regard, Portugal 
first of all argued that the Treaty provision on development cooperation did not 
form a sufficient legal basis for the conclusion of the cooperation agreement 
76 European Council Resolution of 28 November 1991, on Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development (1991), available at http://archive.idea.int/lome/bgr_docs/resolution.html, at 
para. 10. See also Communication from the Commission, on the Inclusion of Respect for 
Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third 
Countries, COM (1995) 216 final (May 23, 1995), and the Council Conclusions of 29 May 
1995, EU Bulletin No. 5/1995 at point 1.2.3 (1995), available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/
en/bulletin-of-the-european-union.-5-1995-pbCMAA95005/. 
77 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Entered into 
force on 27 January 1980.
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with India, since this provision concerned development cooperation and not 
human rights. Portugal further argued that the promotion of human rights 
did not seem to be merely an incidental aspect of the Agreement, since the 
contested provision explicitly stated that “[r]espect for human rights (...) 
constitutes an essential element”.78 Based on this line of argument, Portugal 
concluded that the Agreement could only have been validly adopted if the 
European Union had also used what is now Article 352 TFEU (the flexibility 
provision) as legal basis. The latter provision, however, required unanimity 
amongst the Member States, and would thus have given Portugal the power to 
veto the adoption of the decision, which in turn would amount to a blocking 
of the Agreement with India.
The Court found against Portugal. It observed that Article 1(1) of the 
Agreement merely was a corollary of the requirement that was found in 
the Treaty provision laying down the objectives of the European Union’s 
development cooperation policy. This provision declared that “Community 
policy (...) shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. The European Union was therefore required 
to take account of the objective of respect for human rights when adopting 
measures in the field of development cooperation. The Court of Justice went 
on to observe that the mere fact that Article 1(1) of the Agreement with India 
provided that respect for human rights and democratic principles “constitutes 
an essential element” of the Agreement did not justify the conclusion that that 
provision went beyond the objective stated in the above-mentioned Treaty 
provision on the objectives of EU development cooperation policy. According 
to the Court, the very wording of the latter provision simply demonstrated 
the importance to be attached to respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, so that, amongst other things, development cooperation policy had 
to be adapted to the requirement of respect for those rights and principles. 
The Court also noted that the importance of human rights in the context of 
development cooperation had already been emphasised in various documents 
and declarations of the Member States and the Union, which had been drawn 
up prior to the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.79
78 Emphasis added.
79 At paras 26–27 of the judgment, the Court, while rejecting the Portuguese argument, made 
an implicit reference to the possibility of sanctioning infringements of a human rights 
clause that has been qualified as an “essential element”. Lorand Bartels, human righTS 
CondiTionaliTy in The eu’S inTernaTional agreemenTS (2005), discusses the ruling at pp. 
178–182.
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In the India Agreement case the Court of Justice found that the inclusion 
of human rights as an essential element of a cooperation agreement could 
be based on the development cooperation policy competence (then Article 
130y), and the Advocate General even suggested that without the inclusion 
of such a clause the legality of the cooperation agreement with India could 
be cast in doubt.80 Nevertheless, whilst the promotion of European values 
certainly had come to play an important role during the second phase of 
European Union development cooperation policy, there still were limits, as 
reflected in the Court of Justice’s ruling in the subsequent Philippines Border 
Management Project case. Here the Court ruled that it is not possible to 
render any development cooperation measure valid merely by claiming that 
an overall objective of the contested measure was to promote democracy and 
respect for human rights.
In the Philippines Border Management Project case81 the European Parliament 
challenged a Commission decision whereby the Commission had approved a 
project relating to the security of the borders of the Republic of the Philippines. 
This project was to be financed under a regulation on financial and technical 
assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing countries in 
Asia and Latin America.82 According to the Parliament, the Commission had 
no power to adopt the contested decision since the reasons for the decision 
were based on considerations connected with the fight against terrorism and 
international crime. This, the Parliament argued, went beyond the framework 
of the regulation that served as the decision’s basis.
The Court of Justice agreed that the project was designed to implement concrete 
measures concerned with border management, so the decisive question was 
whether this objective was lawful. In this respect, the Court observed that the 
EC Treaty provisions in Title XX on development cooperation:
80 Advocate General La Pergola in para. 29 of his Opinion found that it would be the absence, 
rather than the inclusion, of a human rights clause in the Agreement that would lead to 
the Agreement being illegal. In the words of La Pergola: “… If that is properly taken into 
account, the democracy clause must indeed be deemed necessary if development cooperation 
policy is to be lawfully pursued. I might venture to add that it would be the failure to adopt 
a clause of that type that would compromise the legality of Community action, because 
compliance with the specific wording of Article 130u would no longer be guaranteed.”
81 Case C-403/05, European Parliament v. Commission (Philippines Border Management 
Project), 2007 E.C.R. I-9045.
82 Council Regulation 443/92, on Financial and Technical Assistance to, and Economic 
Cooperation with, the Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America, 1992 O.J. (L 52) 1 
with subsequent amendment.
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“… refer not only to the sustainable economic and social development 
of those countries, their smooth and gradual integration into the 
world economy and the campaign against poverty, but also to the 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as 
well as to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, whilst 
complying fully with their commitments in the context of the United 
Nations and other international organisations.”
And the Court continued that it followed from the so-called “European 
Consensus on Development”83:
“… that there can be no sustainable development and eradication of 
poverty without peace and security and that the pursuit of the objectives 
of the Community’s new development policy necessarily proceed via 
the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights.”
The Court of Justice, in other words, found that promoting democracy 
and respect for human rights as well as creating sustainable development 
and eradication of poverty were among the objectives of EU development 
cooperation policy. To achieve these objectives it was necessary to ensure 
peace and security, and that essentially was the objective of the contested 
Commission decision. However, the Court of Justice equally observed that 
the contested decision could only be lawfully adopted if it came within 
the framework of the regulation on which it was based. In this respect, the 
Court found that the contested decision’s objective of fighting terrorism and 
international crime fell outside the framework of the regulation on financial 
and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America. Therefore, the Court annulled the 
contested decision.
In sum, promoting democracy and respect for human rights clearly falls 
within the scope of EU development cooperation policy.84 This, however, 
according to the Court in the Philippines Border Management Project case, 
does not exempt a legal development cooperation measure from complying 
with the European Union’s fundamental principles, including the principle 
83 Joint Statement of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European 
Union Development Policy entitled ”The European Consensus”, 2006 O.J. (C 46) 1. 
84 This conclusion is not surprising given that Article 177(2) EC provided that “Community 
policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”
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of conferred powers. Therefore, the fact that, ultimately, a legal development 
cooperation measure promotes democracy and respect for human rights will 
not suffice if the legal basis is insufficient for the actual initiatives intended to 
promote democracy and human rights.
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3  Changes brought about by the  
Lisbon Treaty
3.1 Overview
On 1 December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. It replaced the 
previous three-pillar system with a unitary one, based on two treaties: The 
Treaty on European Union85 (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). A central objective of the new Treaty system was to 
improve the Union’s position on the international stage. The Lisbon changes 
both directly and indirectly affected the European Union’s development 
cooperation policy. In section 3.2 below, we examine the Lisbon Treaty’s 
impact on the Union’s capabilities to carry out a development cooperation 
policy and the restraints imposed by the Treaties on the Union in this respect. 
This is not only a question of the way in which the Lisbon Treaty affects 
the scope and nature of the Union’s development cooperation competence; 
it is also a question of whether the Lisbon Treaty imposes new obligations 
on the Union, which may affect the Union’s exercise of this competence. 
In section 3.3, we briefly account for the institutional and organisational 
changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and their likely consequences 
for the Union’s ability to carry out its development cooperation policy. As 
mentioned, the main point of these sections is not to provide an exhaustive 
account of how the Union’s development cooperation policy might play 
out after Lisbon, but rather to identify the post-Lisbon legal constitutional 
challenges in this policy area. In this respect, it is, in our view, of particular 
interest to consider whether, and to what extent, the classic constitutional 
challenges in this policy area continue, and whether new challenges have 
arrived.
3.2  Capabilities and restraints: Scope, exercise and nature of 
development cooperation competence – status quo?
3.2.1 Introduction
At first glance, the Lisbon Treaty brought only few and limited changes to the 
European Union’s competence in the field of development cooperation. Below 
we first consider to what extent the Lisbon Treaty has affected the scope of 
the Union’s competence and its ability to exercise this competence (section 
3.2.2). Subsequently, we consider the nature of the Union’s competence, i.e. 
 
85 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
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what falls within the Union’s ambit and what falls within that of the Member 
States (section 3.2.3).
3.2.2  Scope of the competences and restraints on the 
exercise of the competences
3.2.2.1 Overview
The provisions in the EC Treaty’s Title XX on development cooperation 
underwent relatively minor changes before becoming Chapter 1 of Title III 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Nevertheless, in 
four ways the Lisbon Treaty entailed changes that, at least potentially, affect 
the scope of the European Union’s competence in the field of development 
cooperation. The first concerns the amendments made with regard to the 
objectives to be pursued through the development cooperation policy 
(section 3.2.2.2). Which impact, if any, do these changes have on the Union’s 
competences in the area? Legally speaking, do the changes strengthen the 
Union’s development cooperation policy objectives? 
Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty imposes a number of obligations on the Union, 
which it must observe in its exercise of development cooperation competence 
(section 3.2.2.3). Are these obligations legally enforceable? Do they impact 
on the way in which the Union can act in this policy field in the future? 
In particular, Article 3(5) TEU now appears to impose an obligation on the 
European Union to promote “European values” in the wider world. Does this 
affect the way in which the Union can exercise its development cooperation 
policy competence? 
Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty has made a number of technical amendments 
of which three deserve particular mention (section 3.2.2.4): (1) With the 
Nice Treaty the European Union was given specific powers in the field of 
“economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries”. In 
section 2.3 above we have seen how this new power gave rise to new tensions 
with the existing powers in the field of development cooperation. Article 212 
TFEU, where we now find the provision on “economic, financial and technical 
cooperation with third countries”, has been amended in certain respects. 
(2) The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a specific provision on humanitarian 
assistance, which now requires its own space, possibly to the detriment of the 
scope of development cooperation policy competence. (3) Finally, the Lisbon 
Treaty has altered the constitutional framework, which governs the European 
Union’s financing of activities in the field of development cooperation.
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3.2.2.2  Amendments to the objectives of European Union 
development cooperation policy – streamlining and 
reorganisation
The Lisbon Treaty has reshuffled and explicated the objectives of the European 
Union in several regards, including with respect to development cooperation 
policy. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, Article 177(1) of the EC Treaty provided 
that the European Union’s development cooperation policy should foster:
“– the sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them,
– the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into 
the world economy,
– the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.”86
Article 177(2) EC provided that:
“Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to 
that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.”87
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the corresponding 
provision – Article 208(1) TFEU – now provides:
“1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be 
conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of 
the Union’s external action. … 
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary 
objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of 
poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries.”88
Basically, this reshuffling entails two interesting changes: First, with the 
second paragraph of Article 208(1), the Union’s development cooperation 
objectives are streamlined. This means a much stronger focus on the primary 
objective, i.e. the fight against poverty in the developing countries. Secondly, 
the remaining, and previously broadly defined objectives of the Union’s 
development cooperation policy (such as the promotion of democracy and 
86 Emphasis added.
87 Emphasis added.
88 Emphasis added.
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the rule of law) have been reorganised and now form part of the general 
“framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action”, 
cf. the first paragraph of Article 208(1), which must be respected in all the 
Union’s external activities, cf. also Article 205 TFEU and Article 21(3) TEU. 
Article 21(1) and (2) TEU list these principles and objectives thus:
“1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law.
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations 
which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in 
the framework of the United Nations.
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international 
relations, in order to:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence 
and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and the principles of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with 
the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external 
borders;
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of developing countries, with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, 
including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade;
…”89
89 Emphasis added.
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It is still too early to say which consequences the streamlining and 
reorganisation have for the Union’s priorities and competences in the field 
of development cooperation. To some extent it may be considered to be a 
matter of political preference whether one considers these changes to entail a 
strengthening or a dilution of the previously defined development cooperation 
objectives. In particular, it can be questioned whether such objectives and 
principles should be part of the Union’s external relations in the first place. 
However, from a legal constitutional perspective, the interesting question 
is whether the changes affect the scope of the Union’s competences or the 
Union’s ability to exercise these competences. The answer to that question is 
not clear-cut. 
In our view, it must be presumed that the treaty-makers intended these 
changes to have a real impact on the Union’s external relations, including on 
its development cooperation policy. Therefore, it could be expected that the 
streamlining and reorganisation will have a noticeable impact, at least in the 
long run: First of all, to elevate some objectives, which could previously be 
found in the Chapter on the Union’s development cooperation policy (e.g. 
to support democracy and the rule of law), to horizontal objectives, which 
must guide all the European Union’s actions in the field of external relations, 
suggests that these objectives have been strengthened from a constitutional 
point of view.90 For example, we should expect to see reference to these 
objectives and principles in more political and legal documents in various 
fields of the Union’s external relations. Moreover, over time, one could 
expect the Court of Justice to use these objectives and principles as legitimate 
teleological guidelines in its interpretation of legal acts in all external 
relations policy areas, including e.g. the Common Commercial Policy. 
More generally, a likely consequence of this generalisation of objectives 
and principles, which previously belonged to specific policy areas, is that 
they will become more firmly embedded in the Union legal order. Second, 
the streamlining – i.e. the fact that Article 208 TFEU explicitly lays down 
that the reduction/eradication of poverty constitutes a “primary objective” 
of European Union development cooperation policy – necessarily suggests 
that within the field of development cooperation this objective will now be 
90 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, Article 11 TEU laid down very similar objectives for the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as those that now apply to the European Union’s 
policies and actions in all fields of international relations.
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accorded particular weight, e.g. in cases of conflict with other objectives.91 
In this respect, it appears arguable that this new primary objective has been 
strengthened with the amendment. The requirement that poverty reduction/
eradication should be a “primary objective” therefore suggests that, among 
the traditional economic and social objectives, which have always formed 
a part of the Union’s development cooperation policy, there should be a 
stronger and more specific focus on poverty reduction/eradication in the 
Union’s policy formulation. Arguably, this would seem to mean that the 
European Union’s specific development initiatives must always (also) pursue 
a goal of poverty reduction. For example, an initiative aimed at improving 
environmental protection in a developing country should also clearly have a 
poverty reducing objective in order to fully comply with Article 208 TFEU. 
Thus, it could be thought, individual development cooperation measures, 
which do not have as their primary objective to reduce/eradicate poverty – 
or which, at least, do not contribute to this objective in the overall context 
of the Union’s development cooperation policy – no longer fall within the 
Union’s development cooperation competences. Apart from this preference 
for poverty reduction/eradication, the streamlining probably does not entail 
new hard legal obligations as regards the Union’s exercise of competence.
As regards Treaty-making competence, Article 209 TFEU provides that 
“The Union may conclude with third countries and competent 
international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the 
objectives referred to in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union 
and in Article 208 of this Treaty.” 
Thus, Article 209 TFEU explicitly foresees international agreements which 
have as their objectives some of the horizontal objectives mentioned in 
Article 21 TEU. In this light, the reorganisation of the Union’s development 
cooperation objectives probably does not entail noticeable new restrictions 
on the Union’s Treaty-making competence in this area. The Court’s judgment 
of 11 June 2014 in the Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Framework 
Agreement case arguably confirms this.92 This judgment is the first concerning 
Article 209 TFEU, and the Court’s reasoning is interesting in several respects. 
91 See in this respect also Henrike Klavert, EU External Action Post-Lisbon: What Place is 
There for Development Policy?, 4 The bulleTin of fridayS of The CommiSSion 18, 18–19 
(2011), http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Newsletter%20mars%202011.pdf. Note that 
eradication of poverty appears both in Article 21(2)(d) TEU and in Article 208 TFEU. In 
contrast to the other objectives, eradication of poverty has thus been duplicated.
92 Judgment of 11 June 2014 in Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council (re the Philippine 
PCFA) (nyr).
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Thus, the judgment deserves a closer analysis at this place: 
The case concerned the correct legal basis for the Council Decision signing the 
Philippines PCFA. The Commission had proposed that the Decision be based 
on Articles 207 TFEU and 209 TFEU (concerning the common commercial 
policy and development cooperation policy, respectively), in conjunction 
with Article 218(5) TFEU. The Council, however, decided to add Articles 
79(3) TFEU (on readmission agreements), 91 TFEU and, 100 TFEU (on 
sea and air transport), and 191(4) TFEU (on environmental protection). The 
Commission brought an annulment action and argued that these additional 
legal bases were unnecessary and unlawful.
After repeating the well-known principles concerning choice of legal basis, 
the Court phrased the central question in the case thus: “it must be determined 
whether, among the provisions of the Framework Agreement, those relating 
to readmission of nationals of the contracting parties, to transport and to the 
environment also fall within development cooperation policy or whether they 
go beyond the framework of that policy and therefore require the contested 
decision to be founded on additional legal bases”.93 
The Court’s analysis of this question can be divided into three parts: First, 
the Court set out the general framework for examining whether certain 
provisions in a cooperation agreement could, more broadly, fall within the 
Union’s development cooperation policy, and whether the Philippines PCFA, 
in particular, pursues the objectives of that policy.94 The Court concluded that, 
in principle, it could. It began by recalling the link between Article 208(1) 
TFEU and Article 21 TEU. The Court noted that reduction/eradication of 
poverty is the primary objective of the policy, but that the cross-reference to 
Article 21(2) TEU entails that the objectives mentioned in the latter provision 
could also be pursued as part of the development cooperation policy. In 
addition, the Court emphasised that the so-called “European Consensus on 
Development”95 confirmed a broad notion of development cooperation, which 
includes readmission and environmental protection, and that the Development 
Cooperation Instrument96 – the European Union’s main financing instrument 
for development cooperation under the Union budget – gave more concrete 
93 Para. 35.
94 Paras 36–47.
95 Joint Statement of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy entitled ”The European Consensus”, 2006 O.J. (C 46) 1. 
96 Regulation 1905/2006 Establishing a Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation 
2006 O.J. (378) 1.
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expression to this broad notion. As regards the Philippines PCFA, the Court 
referred to the preamble and the general principles of the Agreement and 
concluded that “it is apparent from the whole of the Framework Agreement 
that the cooperation and partnership provided for by it take account especially 
of the needs of a developing country and, therefore, contribute to furthering, 
in particular, pursuit of the objectives referred to in Articles 21(2)(d) TEU 
and 208(1) TFEU”. 
Second, the Court examined whether the provisions of the PCFA relating to 
readmission, transport, and the environment also contribute to the pursuit of 
the objectives of development cooperation.97 The Court, again, relied heavily 
on the European Consensus and the Development Cooperation Instrument 
where migration, transport, and the environment are mentioned and thus 
linked to development cooperation objectives. The Court concluded that “the 
provisions of the Framework Agreement relating to readmission of nationals 
of the contracting parties, to transport and to the environment, consistently 
with the European Consensus, contribute to the pursuit of the objectives of 
development cooperation.”
Finally, in a third step, the Court examined “the extent of the obligations” set 
out in the provisions of the PCFA relating to readmission, transport, and the 
environment.98 Were they “limited to declarations”, or did they determine “in 
concrete terms the manner in which the cooperation will be limited”? The Court 
found that the provisions on the environment and transport did not determine 
in concrete terms the manner in which the cooperation will be implemented. 
The provisions on readmission, on the other hand, contained specific 
obligations (of readmission under certain circumstances and of concluding 
an agreement on this issue). However, this obligation does not prescribe 
“in concrete terms” the manner in which readmission is to be implemented, 
since this is left to a subsequent readmission agreement. Therefore, the Court 
said, it is “apparent” that these three types of provisions of the PCFA “do not 
contain obligations so extensive that they may be considered to constitute 
objectives distinct from those of development cooperation that are neither 
secondary nor indirect in relation to the latter objectives”.99
This long-awaited judgment is important for the understanding of how the 
Lisbon Treaty has affected the European Union’s external action in the field 
of development cooperation policy for the following reasons: First, obviously, 
97 Paras 48–55.
98 Paras 56–58.
99 Para.59.
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the judgment confirms our introductory point in this report, i.e. that the scope 
of the present development cooperation policy cannot be understood without 
understanding its evolution. Clearly, the India Agreement case provides a 
crucial backdrop for the Philippines PCFA case. The Court, in broad terms, 
confirmed the basic principles developed in the former case. 
Second, however, in the Philippines PCFA case the Court clearly reframed the 
original principles in the India Agreement case with a view to take account 
of subsequent developments in the Union’s development cooperation policy. 
Thus, there is an interesting evolution in the Court’s reasoning. In paras 36 
et seq, the Court appears (merely) to pay lip-service to the innovations in the 
Lisbon Treaty, i.e. the fact that poverty reduction/eradication is now explicitly 
the primary aim of the Union’s development cooperation policy, and the 
fact that the Union, when implementing this policy on the basis of Article 
209 TFEU, may conclude agreements, which help to achieve the general 
objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU. However, in the Court’s analysis, 
the real benchmark for determining the scope of the Union’s development 
cooperation policy competence appears to be derived not from Articles 208 
TFEU and 209 TFEU, but from the European Consensus and the Development 
Cooperation Instrument.100 In particular, it is remarkable that the Court (in 
para. 55) concludes that the provisions of the PCFA relating to the three 
contested areas “consistently with the European Consensus, contribute to the 
pursuit of the objectives of development cooperation”.
It is not entirely clear what to make of this reasoning. At first sight, one might 
wonder whether the Court is suggesting that the outer limits of the Union’s 
development cooperation policy are defined by a soft law (the European 
Consensus) and a hard law (the Development Cooperation Instrument – a 
regulation) measure adopted prior to the Lisbon Treaty. From a legal point of 
view, this would be unacceptable, since it would conflict with the principles 
of hierarchy of Union law norms. Obviously, this cannot be what the Court 
meant to say. The above reasoning should be understood, instead, as a 
practical way of showing that the provisions of the PCFA fell within Article 
208(1) TFEU, cf. Article 21(2) TEU. The importance attached notably to the 
European Consensus document should be understood as an illustration – not 
a justification – of the conclusion that the provisions of the PCFA fall within 
the scope of development cooperation. However that may be, the judgment 
underlines the practical importance of the European Consensus document and 
the then applicable Development Cooperation Instrument (i.e. Regulation No 
100 Paras 42–43, 49–50, and 55.
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1905/2006). Clearly, Member States and Union institutions should be careful 
when revising these instruments, since the Philippines PCFA case suggests 
that the two measures may have practical, if not legal, importance for the 
overall scope of the Union’s development cooperation competence.
The Court’s reasoning leading up to para. 55 of the Philippines PCFA 
judgment, quoted above, is interesting for another reason. It may suggest 
that the requirement of policy coherence, which has been strengthened by 
the Lisbon Treaty, is taken seriously. More precisely, para. 55 may be read 
to the effect that if the provisions of the PCFA were not “consistent” with 
the European Consensus (in the French version of the judgment, the Court 
has termed this “en cohérence avec le consensus européen”), the conclusion 
might have been different. Thus, the judgment may be thought to reinforce 
the requirement of policy coherence. 
 
Third, the Court clearly confirms the broad construction of the Union’s 
development cooperation policy competence in two ways. Not only does the 
Court confirm that this policy is multi-facetted and can cover a broad range of 
policy areas, the Court also accepts that development cooperation competence 
can be used for relatively deep forms of cooperation in this broad range of 
policy areas. As regards the latter, the Court repeats the distinction made in 
the India Agreement case between cooperation of a declaratory nature and 
cooperation “in concrete terms”. However, the Court accepts that provisions 
in the Philippines PCFA concerning readmission contain specific legal 
obligations and clear rules on how to proceed (by conclusion of a readmission 
agreement), and which thus go beyond mere declaratory statements. In this 
respect, the Philippines PCFA case clearly takes the doctrine developed in the 
India Agreement case a step further. 
This flexibility will probably be useful for Union negotiators, including notably 
the Commission’s DG DEVCO, who may wish an ambitious and holistic 
approach to cooperation with particular developing countries. Arguably, it 
strengthens the Commission’s (and the EEAS’) ability to pursue ambitious 
and multi-facetted types of cooperation in this policy area. However, from 
a legal point of view, this new step is not unproblematic. The Court – for 
the first time – appears to accept that clear legal obligations in the area of 
readmission, which has its own treaty-making competence and a specific 
decision-making procedure, which differs from development cooperation, 
can be assumed on the basis of development cooperation. 
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In this context, it is worth recalling Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion of 
23 January 2014. Like the Court, the AG concluded that the Council wrongly 
included the above-mentioned three legal bases (concerning transport, the 
environment, and readmission of third country nationals). However, though 
he accepted the broad and multi-facetted nature of the notion of development 
cooperation policy, the Advocate General insisted that a careful analysis 
should be made before concluding that development coordination policy 
competence can be used. In the words of the Advocate General: “According to 
the European consensus on development, the areas for European Union action 
are defined so broadly as to allow a link to development to be established in 
every case and no matter what the area concerned. As correctly explained 
by the Council, the European Union’s practice in its relations with less 
developed countries has evolved significantly and has progressed from being 
a mere system of financial assistance to the establishment of comprehensive 
and more elaborate agreements in which reference to ‘mutual’ advantages 
is not mere diplomatic language and the relationship put in place is much 
less lopsided and is, thus, more balanced. It is, however, for that reason that, 
while I can certainly acknowledge the multi-facetted nature of development 
cooperation, I find it, by contrast, more difficult to regard the legal basis 
for development cooperation alone as sufficient when so many and varied 
areas are covered by the same agreement. I call, in that regard, for a certain 
vigilance, precisely because the determination of the appropriate legal basis 
‘has constitutional significance’ for the European Union.”101 
This call for vigilance seems warranted, indeed. With the Lisbon Treaty’s 
cross-reference to the Union’s general objectives in its external action in 
Article 21 TEU, and with the Court’s heavy reliance on broadly defined 
secondary (soft and hard) law in its determination of the scope of the Union’s 
competence, it is appropriate to recall the constitutional significance of the 
choice of legal basis: No specific power-conferring provisions of the Treaty 
should be allowed to become nugatory (to paraphrase the Court from Opinion 
1/78 on the Natural Rubber Agreement and the India Agreement case), and 
no policy competence should be allowed to take precedence over another. 
Indeed, if, for example, the key elements in the Union’s readmission policy 
and the main substantive and procedural obligations vis-à-vis specific third 
countries are, in reality, established in the Union’s development cooperation 
agreements and based on Article 209 TFEU, this would, arguably, be contrary 
to the principle of conferral. Such practice would at least seem to be contrary 
to the spirit of the Treaties, which provide for an independent competence 
101  Point 43 of the Advocate General’s Opinion (footnotes omitted).
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as regards readmission. Moreover, proponents of an ambitious and effective 
development cooperation policy should not forget that the same reasoning 
could be used to pursue quite deep forms of development cooperation policy 
within the framework of, say, the common commercial policy. 
Therefore, though the basic demarcation principle in the Philippines PCFA 
case appears to be clear and reasonable (in the end, the crucial question is 
whether the relevant specific provisions in the agreement determine “in 
concrete terms” issues, which belong to other policy areas), the application 
of this principle should be rigorous. Arguably, the Court’s reasoning (in paras 
56–58) of the Philippines PCFA case is remarkably short and superficial and 
does not provide sufficient security for those who wish to prevent creeping 
Union competences based on open-ended power-conferring provisions. In 
particular, it is not clear from the judgment why the provisions in the PCFA 
concerning readmission are not sufficiently “concrete” to warrant their own 
legal basis, and how much more concretisation can be allowed before an 
additional legal basis is necessary.102 
In sum, the Philippines PCFA judgment clarifies, in a number of ways, the 
method to be used for demarcating (both as regards width and depth) the 
Union’s development cooperation policy competence. The ruling confirms that 
the streamlining and reorganisation of the Union’s development cooperation 
policy competences do not restrict the Union’s competences, and it clarifies the 
method for determining whether a multi-facetted agreement can be concluded 
with reference to the Union’s development cooperation competence, and how 
deep cooperation under such an agreement can be. Overall, the judgment 
appears to construe this competence even more generously than the India 
Agreement case did. In particular, the Court allows for a very significant 
interference with the Union’s readmission agreement competence. At the 
same time, the ruling leaves several fundamental questions open. 
3.2.2.3  New restraints on the Union’s exercise of development 
cooperation competence?  
– PCD and value promotion 
When exercising its development cooperation policy competences, the Union 
must comply with EU law, including the general principles. There is nothing 
new in this respect. However, in the field of development cooperation, after 
Lisbon two principles appear to require particular attention: The first is 
102 Compare AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, points 66 et seq. which contains a much more detailed 
analysis, and which clearly indicates the limits of the use of the development cooperation 
competence in relation to readmission.  
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specifically concerned with development cooperation, whereas the second 
applies to all fields of external action: 
First, the Lisbon Treaty has maintained the requirement of policy coherence 
for development (or PCD) in Article 208(1) TFEU, which provides:
“The Union shall take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries.”
This obliges the Union to pursue coherence between, on the one hand, its 
objectives in the field of development policy and, on the other hand, its 
other policies. This is merely a continuation of the obligation to pursue 
policy coherence for development that previously was laid down in Article 
178 EC.103 Nothing indicates that the Lisbon Treaty has brought about any 
substantive changes as regards this obligation.104
In this context, it should be noted that the Treaties include other provisions 
which more generally require the Union to ensure policy coherence in its 
external relations, cf. notably Articles 3(5) and 21(3) TEU as well as Article 
7 TFEU. These provisions are broadly concerned with the coherence of the 
Union’s policies, in particular in the field of external relations. This requirement 
of coherence in the Union’s external actions, however, falls outside the present 
study, which exclusively focuses on the Union’s development policy.105
The other issue, which deserves particular mention, is the enhanced requirement 
of value promotion. What impact does the reshuffling of the European Union 
development cooperation policy objectives have on the Union’s competence 
to promote its own values (such as democracy and human rights) as part of 
its development cooperation policy? Above in section 2.4 we have shown 
103 See further section 2.2 above.
104 It may be noted that the new Article 214 TFEU on humanitarian aid in section 1 requires 
that “[t]he Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be conducted within the 
framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the Union”. Arguably, 
this is a much narrower coherence obligation than the one laid down in Article 208(1) TFEU.
105 On the general obligation of the European Union to attain coherence in its external relations 
prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see Christophe Hillion, Tous pour un, Un 
pour tous! Coherence in the External relations of the European Union, in developmenTS 
in eu exTernal relaTionS laW, ColleCTed CourSeS of The aCademy of european laW 
(Cremona ed. 2008). For an examination of the same matter post-Lisbon, see Christophe 
Hillion, Cohérence et action extérieure de l’Union européenne (EUI LAW, Working 
Paper No. 14, 2012), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/22354/
LAW_2012_14_Hillion_FINAL.pdf.
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that the European Union has actively pursued the promotion of democracy 
and the respect for human rights as part of its development cooperation 
policy, and that the Court of Justice has accepted this, cf. notably the above-
mentioned India Agreement case and the Philippines Border Management 
Project case. The Lisbon Treaty, however, has taken this promotion one step 
further. According to Article 3(5) TEU, in its relations with the wider world, 
the European Union shall:
“… uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect 
among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the 
protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well 
as to the strict observance and the development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”
This obligation to actively advance European values in the wider world is also 
reflected in Article 21(1) TEU, which provides that “[t]he Union’s action on 
the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance 
in the wider world ...”106
It is recalled that prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Advocate 
General La Pergola in the India Agreement case – somewhat obiter – 
argued that the inclusion of a human rights clause constituted a condition 
of legality. However, the Court of Justice in its ruling in the same case 
refrained from taking a position in this respect. Whilst it might be going too 
far to suggest that Article 3(5) TEU entails that inclusion of a human rights 
clause in international agreements (or, at least, in international development 
cooperation agreements) is legally required, the introduction of the duty to 
promote European values does strengthen the argument that the Union might 
have an obligation to ensure a minimum degree of compliance – and effective 
remedies in case of breach – in its cooperation with developing countries.
106 Emphasis added. See also Article 21(2)(a)–(c) TEU as well as Article 205 TFEU. The latter 
provides that “[t]he Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall 
be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the 
general provisions laid down in [Articles 21 and 22] of the Treaty on European Union.”
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So far, the institutions have only made a limited number of explicit references 
to the obligation in Article 3(5) TEU to promote European values.107 In 
contrast, however, it is easy to find examples where the European Union 
commits to generally promoting its values in the wider world. Thus, for 
instance, in the so-called Stockholm Programme the European Council 
explicitly laid down that “[t]he Union should continue to promote European 
and international standards and the ratification of international conventions, 
in particular those developed under the auspices of the UN and the Council of 
Europe”.108 Similarly, in a communication concerning “A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood” the Commission observed that “[t]he EU does not 
seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but it will 
insist that each partner country’s reform process reflect a clear commitment 
to universal values that form the basis of our renewed approach.”109 And 
similarly, in a communication regarding “A dialogue for migration, mobility 
and security with the southern Mediterranean Countries” the Commission 
observed that “[t]he EU stands ready to continue supporting all its Southern 
107 Amongst the few examples we find European Parliament Resolution, on the Discrimination 
against Girls in Pakistan, in Particular the Case of Malala Yousafzai, 2014 O.J. (CE 72) 
43; European Parliament Resolution, on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity at the United Nations, 2013 O.J. (CE 56) 100; European Parliament Resolution, on 
International Trade Policy in the Context of Climate Change Imperatives, 2012 O.J. (CE 
99) 94; European Parliament Resolution, on Human Rights and Social and Environmental 
Standards in International Trade Agreements, 2012 O.J. (CE 99) 31; and European 
Parliament Resolution, on EU Policies in Favour of Human Rights Defenders, 2011 O.J. (CE 
236) 69; as well as the European Parliament’s resolution in which it laid down its priorities 
for the annual UN Human Rights Councils. In the latter resolutions the European Parliament 
explicitly referred to Article 3(5) TEU whilst observing that “respect for, and the promotion 
and safeguarding of, the universality of human rights is part of the European Union’s 
ethical and legal acquis and one of the cornerstones of European unity and integrity”, see 
for instance European Parliament Resolution, on the 13th Session of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council, 2010 O.J. (C 348) 6. See likewise European Parliament Resolution, 
on Democracy Building in the EU’s External Relations, 2010 O.J. (CE 265) 3, in particular 
para. F; European Parliament Resolution, on Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain 
Persons and Entities Associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network and the 
Taliban, in Respect of Zimbabwe and in View of the Situation in Somalia, 2010 O.J. (C 286) 
5, para. A; and European Parliament Resolution, on Religious Freedom in Pakistan, 2011 
O.J. (CE 161) 147, para. A. See also Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 
P, Commission and Others v. Kadi, 2013 O.J. (C 260) 2, para. 103, and the pending Case 
T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, 2013 O.J. (C 55) 14.
108 The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 
2010 O.J. (C 115) 1, at para. 7.6. For another example, see Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - Tax and 
Development Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in 
Tax Matters, SEC (2010) 426 final (Apr. 21, 2010).
109 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood, COM (2011) 303 final (June 8, 2011) (emphasis added).
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neighbours who are willing to commit to democracy, human rights, good 
governance and rule of law, and to enter into Partnerships with those countries 
to achieve concrete progress for the people.”110
The question is, then, whether and, if so, to what extent the obligation to 
further European values affects the European Union’s competence in the 
field of development cooperation? Here, the answer is probably twofold. 
Firstly, the obligation in Article 3(5) TEU makes it clear that the European 
Union must work actively to further its own values. This makes it easier, 
both internally and externally, to promote the agenda of value promotion in 
the Union’s external activities, including in the specific legal instruments.111 
It also means, however, that Article 3(5) TEU cannot simply be ignored, 
not even temporarily, in the Union’s policy formulation. Depending on how 
narrowly and short-sightedly the objective is construed, this might limit the 
Union’s possibilities of cooperating with certain third countries. 
Secondly, Article 3(5) TEU does not impose specific obligations as to 
how the European Union must further its own values.112 For example, the 
new provision does not entail that a human rights clause in a cooperation 
agreement with a developing country is a condition of internal legality under 
EU law. Even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Union was rather active in promoting its own values in the wider world. 
Overall, in our view, Article 3(5) TEU appears to be important mainly for the 
Union’s international identity, including for its external relations discourses. 
However, it is questionable whether the requirement to promote its own 
values in the world is also a legal obligation in specific relations with third 
countries. Moreover, nothing indicates that Article 3(5) TEU requires a more 
intensive effort in this regard.113
110 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Dialogue 
for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries, COM 
(2011) 292 final (May 24, 2011).
111 Morten Broberg, From Colonial Power to Human Rights Promotor: On the Legal Regulation 
of the European Union’s Relations with the Developing Countries, 26 Cambridge revieW of 
inTernaTional affairS 675, 682–683 (2013).
112 Though this promotion must respect the other objectives and principles of the Union’s 
external actions.
113 On the consequences flowing from Article 3(5) TEU, see also Morten Broberg, What is 
the Direction for the EU’s Development Cooperation after Lisbon?: A Legal Examination, 
16 european foreign affairS revieW 539, 548–554 (2011), and Morten Broberg, From 
Colonial Power to Human Rights Promotor: On the Legal Regulation of the European 
Union’s Relations with the Developing Countries, 26 Cambridge revieW of inTernaTional 
affairS 675, 682–683 (2013). 
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3.2.2.4  Other amendments, which impact the scope of the Union’s 
development cooperation policy competence
3.2.2.4.1  Development cooperation versus cooperation with third 
countries
In section 2.3 above, we have seen that in 1993 the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced a specific Title on “Development Cooperation” into the EC Treaty 
(Title XX), and that in 2003 the Nice Treaty introduced another Title on 
“Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries” into 
the EC Treaty (Title XXI). It was not immediately clear to what extent the 
introduction of Title XXI into the EC Treaty affected (narrowed) the scope 
of that Treaty’s Title XX. In the European Investment Bank case the Court of 
Justice effectively ruled that there was no such effect.114
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we find the previous Title 
XXI of the EC Treaty in Chapter 2 of Title III, Part Five of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. This Chapter provides as follows:
“Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries”
Article 212 TFEU
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, and in 
particular Articles 208 to 211, the Union shall carry out economic, 
financial and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, in 
particular financial assistance, with third countries other than developing 
countries. Such measures shall be consistent with the development policy 
of the Union and shall be carried out within the framework of the principles 
and objectives of its external action. The Union’s operations and those of 
the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures 
necessary for the implementation of paragraph 1. 
3. Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the 
Member States shall cooperate with third countries and the competent 
international organisations. The arrangements for Union cooperation 
may be the subject of agreements between the Union and the third 
parties concerned. 
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the Member 
States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements. 
114 See section 2.3 above.
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Article 213 TFEU
When the situation in a third country requires urgent financial 
assistance from the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary 
decisions on a proposal from the Commission.”115
With regard to the delimitation between the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’s Chapter on development cooperation vis-à-vis the same 
Treaty’s Chapter on economic, financial, and technical cooperation with third 
countries, we observe that whereas the previous Article 181a EC provided 
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, and in particular 
those of Title XX [on development cooperation]”, the new Article 212 TFEU 
provides “Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, and in 
particular Articles 208 to 211 [on development cooperation]”. Moreover, 
whereas Article 181a EC provided “Such measures shall be complementary to 
those carried out by the Member States and consistent with the development 
policy of the Community”, Article 212 TFEU now provides “assistance, in 
particular financial assistance, with third countries other than developing 
countries. Such measures shall be consistent with the development policy of 
the Union …”. The only apparent difference between Article 181a EC and 
Article 212 TFEU seems to be that the latter now explicitly lays down that it 
applies to “third countries other than developing countries”. This is, however, 
merely a codification of the Court of Justice’s ruling in European Investment 
Bank on the scope of Article 181a EC.
Thus, it seems fairly safe to conclude that there is no substantive difference 
between the two provisions when it comes to the effect they may have on the 
scope of the European Union’s development cooperation policy. The Lisbon 
Treaty has also harmonised the decision-making procedure so that the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies irrespective of whether a measure is adopted on 
the basis of one or the other of the two competences.116 This means that the 
European Parliament will take full part irrespective of which legal basis is 
being invoked, thus removing a source of potential inter-institutional conflict. 
3.2.2.4.2 Humanitarian aid
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union in Article 214 TFEU has been 
given explicit powers in the field of humanitarian aid. This provision provides 
as follows:
115  Emphasis has been added in the quotation of Article 212.
116  With the exception of cases falling under Article 213 TFEU.
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“Article 214 TFEU on humanitarian aid
1. The Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be 
conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of 
the external action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended 
to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in 
third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in 
order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different 
situations. The Union’s measures and those of the Member States shall 
complement and reinforce each other.
2. Humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance 
with the principles of international law and with the principles of 
impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination. 
3. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures 
defining the framework within which the Union’s humanitarian aid 
operations shall be implemented. 
4. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent 
international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1 and in Article 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
agreements.
5. […]
6. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote 
coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member 
States, in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of 
Union and national humanitarian aid measures. 
7. The Union shall ensure that its humanitarian aid operations are 
coordinated and consistent with those of international organisations 
and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United Nations 
system.”
As observed in section 2.3 above, prior to the introduction of Article 214 
TFEU, European Union humanitarian aid was provided on the basis of the 
Union’s competence in the field of development cooperation, although it was 
rather doubtful whether this competence could be used to this end. With the 
introduction of Article 214 TFEU, any doubts with regards to whether the 
Union has competence in the field of humanitarian aid have been dispelled. At 
the same time, based on a lex specialis interpretation, it has become equally 
clear that the Union’s competence in the field of development cooperation can 
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no longer be used to provide humanitarian aid. Article 4(4) TFEU lays down 
that in the field of humanitarian aid to third countries the European Union 
and the Member States shall have parallel competences (shared competence 
without pre-emption).117
3.2.2.4.3 Financing development cooperation assistance
Financing has always been a central issue in the field of development 
cooperation. For development cooperation, as some of the case law concerning 
the first phase described in section 2.2 above has shown, the Member States 
have insisted on keeping a main financing instrument (the EDFs) outside the 
Union framework. In this respect, development cooperation policy differs 
considerably from other Union policies, such as the common agricultural 
policy, cohesion funds, etc. 
Assistance to the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States falling under 
the Cotonou Agreement is financed via the so-called EDF, whereas all other 
development assistance is financed through the European Union’s budget. 
Financing via the EDF essentially means that the funding does not come 
under the European Union’s general budget, but instead is funded by the 
Member States, is subject to its own financial rules, and is managed by a 
specific committee. For the period 2008–2013, assistance granted to ACP 
States and to the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) was funded by 
the tenth EDF.118 The consequence of the special scheme set up with regards 
to the EDFs is that whilst this assistance is administered by the European 
Commission under Regulation 617/2007,119 the Member States themselves 
decide the size of the contribution and also control the funds. Essentially, 
this means that the European Union institutions have rather limited powers 
in this respect. This framework is expected to continue in an 11th EDF, 
which will cover a seven-year period running from 2014–2020.120 However, 
the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have 
ambitions of bringing the aid scheme to ACP and OCT countries closer to 
117 See also section 3.2.3 below.
118 The tenth EDF covered the period from 2008 to 2013 and provided an overall budget of EUR 
22 682 million.
119 Council Regulation 617/2007, on the Implementation of the 10th European Development 
Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, 2007 O.J. (L 152) 1. 
120 See the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative to the 
European Parliament and the Council “Global Europe: A New Approach to Financing EU 
External Action”, COM (2011) 865 final (Dec. 11, 2011). 
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the Union budget.121 Do the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty justify 
such a development? Whilst the Lisbon Treaty does not explicitly change the 
existing dual financing system, it may be thought to facilitate such transition. 
Hence, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, Article 179 EC provided as follows:
“1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, the Council, 
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, 
shall adopt the measures necessary to further the objectives referred 
to in Article 177. Such measures may take the form of multiannual 
programmes.
2. The European Investment Bank shall contribute, under the terms 
laid down in its Statute, to the implementation of the measures referred 
to in paragraph 1.
3. The provisions of this Article shall not affect cooperation with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the framework of the 
ACP-EC Convention.”
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 209 TFEU provides 
the following:
“1. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures 
necessary for the implementation of development cooperation policy, 
which may relate to multiannual cooperation programmes with 
developing countries or programmes with a thematic approach. 
2. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent 
international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the 
objectives referred to in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union 
and in Article 208 of this Treaty.
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
agreements. 
3. The European Investment Bank shall contribute, under the terms 
laid down in its Statute, to the implementation of the measures referred 
to in paragraph 1.”
121 On page 11 of the above-mentioned Joint Communication, it is said that “Member States’ 
contribution keys to the 11th EDF should be brought closer to the general EU budget 
contribution keys in order to facilitate the integration of the EDF in the EU budget at a later 
stage.”
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Thus, the EC Treaty’s explicit reference in Article 179(3) to the European 
Union’s cooperation with the ACP countries has been deleted. This deletion, 
it has been argued, means that a formal obstacle to Union budgetisation of 
EDF funds has been removed.122 
The Commission and the EEAS consider the Lisbon amendments and 
the development in EU external relations in general to signal a desire 
to move the EDF funds closer to the Union budget. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty amendments in themselves have not been sufficient to foster this 
development, and, presently, it seems that further integration on this point has 
been postponed until negotiations on the post-2020 financing.
3.2.3 Nature of the competences
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, development cooperation was 
a shared competence between the European Union and the Member States. 
This is clear from Article 177 EC, which laid down that the European Union’s 
policy in the sphere of development cooperation should be complementary 
to the policies pursued by the Member States, and it was confirmed by the 
Court of Justice’s ruling in the Lomé IV case.123 One of the novelties of the 
Lisbon Treaty is that in Articles 2–6 TFEU, the Treaty drafters have explicitly 
categorised the nature of the European Union’s competences in the various 
fields of EU law. With regard to the areas of development cooperation (and 
humanitarian aid), Article 4(4) TFEU provides that:
“… the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and 
conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence 
shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising 
theirs.”
It thus follows from Article 4(4) TFEU that the European Union and the 
Member States have shared competence, and that the Union’s exercise of its 
competence does not pre-empt that of the Member States’.124 Both have parallel 
122 Cf. Henrike Klavert, EU External Action Post-Lisbon: What Place is There for Development 
Policy?, 4 The bulleTin of fridayS of The CommiSSion 18, 21–22 (2011), http://ea.au.int/en/
sites/default/files/Newsletter%20mars%202011.pdf.
123 See section 2.3 above.
124 See likewise Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the European 
Union: the Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in The evoluTion of eu laW 253, (Craig & 
de Búrca eds., 2011).
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or fully concurrent competences in the field of development cooperation.125 
The parallel nature of European Union and Member States competence is 
confirmed by Articles 208 and 209 TFEU. Article 208(1) TFEU lays down 
the complementarity obligation (as did Article 177 EC referred to above). It 
provides inter alia:
“… The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the 
Member States complement and reinforce each other.”
If the European Union had held exclusive competence in the area of 
development cooperation, the complementarity obligation would not make 
sense. Moreover, if competence in the field of development cooperation 
had been shared with pre-emption, it would seem more logical to render the 
Member States’ competence complementary to that of the Union, whereas 
Article 208 TFEU categorises the competences of the two sides as mutually 
complementary.126 This is further corroborated by Article 209(2) TFEU 
on the entering into international agreements in the field of development 
cooperation. It provides:
“2. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent 
international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the 
objectives referred to in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union 
and in Article 208 of this Treaty.
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
agreements.”
Article 209(2) TFEU thus vests in the European Union competence to conclude 
international agreements in matters of development cooperation, but adds, in 
line with Article 4(4) TFEU, that this does not pre-empt the competence of the 
Member States. Thus, the European Union and the Member States continue 
to have shared competence without pre-emption in the field of development 
125 Article 4 TFEU identifies those areas where shared competence applies. Thus, Article 4(2) 
TFEU identifies those areas where the normal system of shared competence (i.e. including 
pre-emption) applies, whereas Article 4(3) and (4) TFEU identify those areas where shared 
competence without pre-emption applies.
126 Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the competence of the European Union was 
complementary to that of the Member States. The Lisbon Treaty thus has made a change in 
this regard, which we consider below in this section.
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cooperation policy.127 As Eeckhout notes, “[t]he lack of pre-emptive effect 
on Member States competences is in the nature of development co-operation 
policies, which do not involve any law-making of the kind justifying such 
pre-emption”.128 This does not exclude, of course, that general principles of 
EU law, such as the duty of loyal cooperation and the principle of supremacy 
of EU law, may require that Member States do not act in ways that conflict 
with or undermine the Union’s development cooperation activities.
In sum, as regards the scope and nature of the Union’s development cooperation 
policy, very little has changed with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty has subtly amended the hierarchical relationship between Union and 
Member State development cooperation policies. As noted above, Article 
208(1) TFEU lays down that the European Union’s development cooperation 
policy and those of the Member States complement and reinforce each other. 
This differs from the pre-Lisbon situation where Article 177 EC provided 
that the European Union’s policy in the sphere of development cooperation 
should be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States. 
Hence, whereas Member State policies previously took precedence over the 
Union’s development cooperation policy, today neither can claim superiority 
over the other. This amendment may provide an important constitutional 
foundation for a strengthening of Union development cooperation policy vis-
à-vis the Member States’ policies. In particular, it may provide a stronger 
basis for requiring Member States to comply with general principles of EU 
law, including the principle of supremacy and the duty of loyal cooperation, 
also in this field. In the short-term day-to-day policy formulation, however, 
the change is unlikely to have a real substantive impact.
The European Union’s and the Member States’ parallel competences in the 
field of development cooperation leave more room for Member State action 
than what we find in most other policy areas with shared competence. This 
fact together with the duty to attain coherence,129 complementarity,130 and 
127 By contrast, Duke and Blockmans appear to take the view that, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, 
European Union and Member States competences in the field of development cooperation 
were shared without pre-emption, whereas following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the competences have become shared with pre-emption. See Simon Duke & Steven 
Blockmans, The Lisbon Treaty Stipulations on Development Cooperation and the Council 
Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the 
European External Action Service, CLEER Legal Brief (2010), available at http://www.
asser.nl/upload/documents/542010_121127CLEER%20Legal%20Brief%202010-05.pdf.
128 Piet Eeckhout, eu exTernal relaTionS laW 139 (2nd ed. 2011).
129 Article 208(1)(2) TFEU.
130 Article 208(1)(1) TFEU.
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coordination131 arguably highlights the fundamental EU principle of loyal 
cooperation between the different actors. In this respect, the fact that the 
Union and the Member States are under an obligation to coordinate their 
development cooperation policies so as to ensure the effectiveness thereof 
implies that, in practice, Member State policies must pursue the development 
cooperation objectives that are laid down in the Treaties – objectives which 
to a considerable extent are a reflection of objectives originally established 
within international fora. Like the Union institutions, several Member 
States nevertheless pursue broader foreign policy objectives through their 
development cooperation policy, and these broader objectives are sometimes 
inconsistent with those found in the Treaties. Arguably, this may infringe the 
general EU law principle of loyal cooperation.
3.3  Institutional changes: Streamlining or new areas of 
conflict?
3.3.1 Overview
A central objective underlying the Lisbon Treaty was to strengthen the 
European Union’s presence and negotiating ability on the international scene. 
To this end, the Lisbon Treaty created a new institutional set-up with particular 
regard to the Union’s external relations. However, other institutional changes, 
not specifically aimed at the Union’s presence on the international scene, 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are likely to impact on the European 
Union’s development cooperation policy.
Below we first consider how the Lisbon changes have affected the European 
Parliament’s and the Commission’s powers in the legislative process (section 
3.3.2). Next, we consider how the Lisbon Treaty’s fundamental changes to 
the so-called comitology system may lead to thorough changes in the balance 
between, on the one hand, the Member States and, on the other hand, in 
particular the Commission with regards to the practical implementation of 
the Union’s development cooperation policy (section 3.3.3). Finally, and most 
importantly, we will consider the consequences which the creation of the post 
of High Representative and of the European External Action Service will 
have on EU development cooperation (section 3.3.4).
131 Article 210 TFEU.
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3.3.2  Legal basis challenges by the European Parliament and 
the Commission
In section 2.3 above the Court of Justice’s rulings in the European Investment 
Bank132 and the ECOWAS133 cases vividly illustrated that prior to the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament vigorously defended its 
legislative role under the co-decision procedure (today the ordinary legislative 
procedure) that applied within the field of development cooperation. It is 
recalled that the European Investment Bank case concerned the delimitation 
between, on the one hand, development cooperation policy and, on the other 
hand, economic, financial, and technical cooperation with third countries, 
where the European Parliament was a co-decider under the former, but not 
under the latter. This procedural divergence has been abandoned with the 
Lisbon Treaty so that today the Parliament is a co-decider irrespective of 
whether a measure is adopted on the basis of one or the other legal basis (or 
both).
Likewise, in the field of humanitarian aid the new legal basis in Article 214 
TFEU provides that measures must be adopted according to the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The same procedure therefore applies regardless 
of whether a measure is considered to be development cooperation or 
humanitarian aid.134 It follows from this harmonisation of the legislative 
procedures that disputes like the one in the European Investment Bank case 
regarding the choice of legal basis are unlikely in the future.
The situation illustrated by the ECOWAS case is different, however. It is 
recalled that in the ECOWAS case the Commission challenged a measure 
adopted by the Council within the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) framework. The pillar structure has been abandoned with the Lisbon 
Treaty, but the CFSP continues to be governed by special (intergovernmental) 
provisions in Title V, Chapter 2 of the TEU. At the same time, the new 
institutional structure,135 the reorganisation of the Union’s external relations 
132 Case C-155/07, European Parliament v. Council (European Investment Bank), 2008 E.C.R. 
I-8103.
133 Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council (ECOWAS), 2008 E.C.R. I-3651.
134 Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was debatable whether the Treaty 
provisions on development cooperation provided sufficient legal basis for the adoption of 
measures regarding humanitarian aid, cf. above section 1.2.3 at footnote 27. To the extent 
that the development cooperation measures did not provide a sufficient legal basis, recourse 
would arguably have to be had to the so-called “flexibility provision” in Article 352 TFEU 
(which requires unanimity amongst the Member States). See further the discussion in 
Morten Broberg, Undue Assistance? An Analysis of the Legal Basis of Regulation 1257/96 
Concerning Humanitarian Aid, 34 european laW revieW 769, 772–775 (2009).
135 See section 3.3.4 below.
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objectives, and the reinforcement of the obligation to ensure coherence in the 
external field136 are likely to further the use of multi-facetted external relations 
instruments, such as those which were the subject of the India Agreement, 
the ECOWAS, and the Philippines Border Management cases. In particular, 
we may expect an increase in the use of measures which incorporate both 
CFSP and development cooperation aspects. Such development gives us 
reasons to expect new clashes between the Council, on the one hand, and 
the Commission and the European Parliament, on the other.137 Moreover, 
as we shall see below, the introduction of the High Representative and the 
EEAS may even complicate and exacerbate some of these inter-institutional 
conflicts. 
3.3.3 Comitology
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, comitology committees 
formed a central part of the European Union’s regulatory machinery also in 
the field of development cooperation.138 Thus, the European Commission 
Secretary General’s Annual reports show that during the three-year period 
from 2006 to 2008, 795 implementing measures were adopted by the 
Commission under Council decision 1999/468 (the comitology decision)139 
in the development cooperation field.140 Most of these measures were 
adopted according to the so-called “management procedure”. The European 
 
 
136 Cf. Article 21(3)(2) TEU.
137 Indeed, a first such clash has already been played out before the Court in the Philippines 
PCFA case, cf. section 3.2.2.2. above. As we indicate in that section, the judgment suggests 
considerable constitutional flexibility as regards the possibility of using the development 
cooperation competence for such multi-facetted instruments. Moreover, it may be read as a 
reinforcement of the obligation to ensure coherence in the external field.
138 The committees in the field of development cooperation were “European Development 
Fund Committee (EDF)”, “ENPI Committee (European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument)”, “DCI Committee (Development Cooperation Instrument)”, “IFS Committee 
(Instrument for Stability)”, “INSC Committee (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation)”, 
“EIDHR Committee (Democracy and Human Rights Committee)”, and “Humanitarian 
Aid Committee (HAC)”, cf. Comitology Committees Assisting the European Commission 
– Total Numbers of Committees February 2008 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regcomitology/docs/comitology_committees_en.pdf. 
139 Council Decision, Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers 
Conferred on the Commission, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23. 
140 Cf. Opinion of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Legal Affairs on 
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying 
Down the Rules and General Principles Concerning Mechanisms for Control by Member 
States of the Commission’s Exercise of Implementing Powers, (COM(2010)0083 – C7 
0073/2010 – 2010/0051(COD)) (2008), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-441.193+02+DOC+WORD+V0//
EN&language=EN. 
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Parliament was not satisfied with this and therefore worked towards changing 
the procedure in order to increase its influence.141
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has led to an extensive overhaul of 
the previous comitology scheme. Articles 289–291 TFEU have introduced 
a distinction between legislative acts and non-legislative acts. Acts adopted 
by legislative procedure constitute legislative acts.142 Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU, however, provide for two categories of non-legislative acts 
– namely, delegated acts (roughly, delegation of legislative powers) and 
implementing acts (roughly, delegation of executive powers). Where the 
European Commission adopts a delegated act, this act will be under the direct 
control of the European Parliament and the Council, which can reject the 
act or revoke the delegation. In contrast, where the Commission adopts an 
implementing act, only the Member States (but not the European Parliament) 
have the power to control the implementation.143 From the point of view of 
the European Parliament, the use of delegated acts possesses the attraction 
that the Parliament retains some control over the acts to be adopted. On the 
other hand, it also appears likely that in certain situations the Parliament will 
favour implementing acts – namely, in those situations where this means 
that only the precise (less important) technical details are ‘postponed’ to the 
implementing act.
This novel distinction leaves considerable scope for interpretation, and 
disputes between the European Parliament and the Commission (and 
Council) have arisen in many areas, including in the field of development 
cooperation. Thus, the Commission’s proposal to amend the regulations on the 
financing instruments for the promotion of democracy and human rights,144 
for cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries,145 and 
for development cooperation146 led to intense discussions as to whether 
this should be done through the delegated acts procedure, as the European 
Parliament argued, or through the implementing acts procedure, as argued by 
141 The European Parliament favoured the so-called regulatory procedure with scrutiny.
142 Cf. Article 289(3) TFEU.
143 See Regulation 182/2011, Laying Down the Rules and General Principles Concerning 
Mechanisms for Control by Member States of the Commission’s Exercise of Implementing 
Powers, 2011 O.J. (L 55) 13. 
144 Regulation 1889/2006, on Establishing a Financing Instrument for the Promotion of 
Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 1. 
145 Regulation 1934/2006, Establishing a Financing Instrument for Cooperation with 
Industrialised and Other High-Income Countries and Territories, 2006 O.J. (L 405) 41. 
146 Regulation 1905/2006, Establishing a Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation, 
2006 O.J. (L 378) 41. 
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the Council. In the specific case a compromise deal was struck.147 However, 
similar battles are likely to arise in the future. The outcome of such future 
battles will be of decisive importance with regards to the institutional balance 
of power amongst the European Union’s three legislative institutions: the 
Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament.
3.3.4  High Representative and European External Action 
Service
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was often argued that 
in international affairs the European Union punched below its weight, and 
that an important reason for this was the Union’s internal organisation, or 
rather lack of a coherent organisation. A key objective behind the Lisbon 
Treaty, therefore, was to improve the Union’s ability to act efficiently on the 
international stage. To this end, a new position as High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created.148
One of the essential functions of the High Representative is to bridge both 
Member State and Union interests. This is reflected in the remarkable array of 
tasks assigned to the High Representative in Articles 18(2)–(4) and 27(1)–(2) 
TEU. According to these provisions, the High Representative shall conduct the 
European Union’s common foreign and security policy, contribute proposals 
to the development of this policy, carry it out as mandated by the Council, and 
preside over the Foreign Affairs Council. Moreover, the High Representative 
is one of the vice presidents of the Commission and is generally responsible 
within the Commission for its external relations responsibilities and for 
coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action.149
The creation of the position as High Representative is intended to significantly 
improve the European Union’s ability to speak with one voice, and thereby to 
improve coherence in its external affairs policies. In order to enable the High 
Representative to carry out her tasks, she is assisted by a diplomatic service 
147 On the specific case, see further Manon Malhère, Financing Instruments for EU External 
Action: EP and Council Battle it out over Delegated Acts, EUROPOLITICS (2012), 
available at http://www.europolitics.info/dossiers/comitology/ep-and-council-battle-it-out-
over-delegated-acts-art325507-73.html. 
148 See Article 18 TEU. 
149 It has been argued that “[t]he High Representative’s close link with the EU member states is 
pushing development cooperation closer to an intergovernmental level”, cf. Jeske van Seters, 
EU Funding for Africa, Business as Usual or Changes Ahead?, 4 The bulleTin of fridayS 
of The CommiSSion 24, 27 (2011), http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Newsletter%20
mars%202011.pdf. Jeske van Seters apparently seems to consider this push towards 
an intergovernmental level advantageous with regards to improving coordination and 
complementarity between Member States and the European Union.
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– the European External Action Service (EEAS). This service is independent 
of the Member States as well as of the Council and the Commission. Until 
now, the staff has primarily been drawn from the Member States’ diplomatic 
services as well as from the Council and the Commission.
Which new constitutional challenges have the creation of these new actors 
caused for the Union’s development cooperation policy?150 The establishment 
of the EEAS has been of particular importance for the internal organisation of 
the Union’s development cooperation policy.151 One of the most contentious 
issues in relation to the establishment of the EEAS has been – and continues 
to be – whether and, if so, to what extent this new actor should be in charge 
of development cooperation policy. This question was at the centre of the 
sometimes heated debates about the division of tasks between the Commission 
and the EEAS leading up to Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service.152 As 
van Vooren notes: 
“... many in the development community were worried that giving 
a role to the EEAS in EU development policy was a ruse of the 
Member States to ensure that aid resources presently managed by the 
Commission would be used for strategically directed objectives rather 
than long-term structural development objectives.”153
150 There is already a growing body of literature on the legal nature and competences of the 
High Representative and the EEAS. Whilst the introduction of these new actors also impacts 
the Union’s development cooperation policy, their impact is a question of a general nature, 
and therefore falls outside the scope of the present report.
151 For an early examination of the EEAS, see the European Parliament study by Jan Wouters, 
et al., The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: 
Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities (2013), available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457111/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457111_
EN.pdf. With particular regard to the EEAS and development cooperation policy, see pp. 
49–50 of the study. 
152 Council Decision, Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External 
Action Service, 2010 O.J. (L 210) 30. See, for instance, Honor Mahony, Ashton Presents 
Outline of Diplomatic Service, EU Observer (2010), available at http://euobserver.
com/18/29769. In his article, Mahony particularly points to the very considerable sums 
involved in EU development cooperation as a reason why this area came to constitute the 
ground for one of “the most bitter battles” regarding the scope and contents of the EEAS. 
See also, for a more recent analysis, Isabelle Tannous, The Programming of EU’s External 
Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG 
DEVCO, 18 european foreign affairS revieW 329 (2013).
153 See Bart van Vooren, A Legal-institutional Perspective on the European External Action 
Service, 48 Common mkT. l. rev. 475 (2011).
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In other words, to transfer development cooperation policy competence 
from the Commission to the EEAS is not merely a technical question of 
institutional balance. The transfer of such competence to the EEAS may well 
lead to a higher degree of coherence between the development cooperation 
policy and other external policies. In particular, transferring some of this 
competence to the EEAS might entail a weakening of the marked distinction 
which hitherto the Commission has applied between, on the one hand, 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and, on the other hand, other 
developing countries. A transfer of development policy competence to the 
EEAS may also entail more coherence with regards to thematic divisions, 
since the transfer to the EEAS means that subjects that previously were treated 
by different directorates general within the Commission will now be treated 
under one and the same roof. However, the impetus for the EEAS to create a 
single, consistent external policy may mean that these policies may become so 
tightly interwoven that it will prove difficult to distinguish one from the other. 
In such a situation, it may be feared that the “soft” development cooperation 
policy objectives will “suffer” under the influence of other “harder” and more 
traditional foreign policy objectives.154 Moreover, arguably, one should not 
exaggerate the positive effects on policy coherence resulting from a transfer 
of more development policy competence to the EEAS.155
154 See in this respect EEAS One Year On: “Work in progress”, for poverty eradication, Concord 
Europe (2012), available at http://www.concordeurope.org/98-eeas-one-year-on-work-in-
progress-for-poverty-eradication; and Simon Stroß, Programming Financial Instruments 
Post-Lisbon: The European External Action Service and the New Institutional Architecture 
of EU External Action, Paper for conference The European Union in International Affairs 
III (May 3–5, 2012), available at http://www.exact.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/home/strosss/
Stross__2012__Programming_financial_instruments_post-Lisbon_-_The_EEAS_and_the_
new_institutional_architecture_of_EU_external_action.pdf. See also Mark Furness, Opinion: 
The European External Action Service’s Role in EU Development Policymaking Requires 
Safeguards, Deutsche Welle (2010), available at http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,5633787,00.
html; and the discussions in Is EU Development Aid Entering a New Era in the Wake of 
the Lisbon Treaty?, Development Policy Forum (2008), available at http://www.dochas.ie/
pages/resources/documents/2008_DPF_LT_Report_EN_for_web.pdf. Contrast, however, 
with the more optimistic view put forward by Mario Giuseppe Varrenti, EU Development 
Cooperation after Lisbon: The Role of the European External Action Service (EU Diplomacy 
Papers, Working Paper No. 10, 2010), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/15480/. 
155 Not all external policy subjects with a close connection to development cooperation policy 
are transferred to the EEAS. In particular, trade and humanitarian aid remain within the 
remit of the Commission. Hence, the partial transfer of development cooperation from the 
Commission to the EEAS is not likely to lead to increased coherence between development 
on the one hand and trade and humanitarian aid on the other. In this respect, see also Geert 
Laporte, The Africa-EU Partnership in a Post-Lisbon and Post-Tripoli Context, 4 The 
bulleTin of fridayS of The CommiSSion 13, 16 (2011), http://ea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/
Newsletter%20mars%202011.pdf.
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It has been argued that the Treaties preclude the transfer of development 
cooperation policy responsibility to the EEAS. Thus, the law firm of White & 
Case has argued that “on a strict reading of the Treaty, the role of the EEAS 
is restricted to the CFSP”, and that “[i]t can be argued that development 
cooperation activities do not substantially relate to the CFSP as defined; rather 
these activities reside in the realm of ‘the rest of the Union’s external action’ 
for which the High Representative acts as Commissioner and possesses 
only a coordination function, and in relation to which the EEAS is to have 
no role”.156 The law firm continues by noting that the proposal to transfer 
important parts of development cooperation policy from the Commission 
services to the EEAS “cannot alter areas of competence as defined under 
the Treaties, such as the ‘exclusive competence’ of the Commission in 
development cooperation activities.”157 And it concludes that “[d]etracting 
from the exclusive competence of the Commission would require a formal 
Treaty amendment.”158 Arguments of this kind tend to rest on the Treaty 
provisions on external representation. Thus, Article 17(1) TEU provides 
that it is the Commission’s competence to “ensure the Union’s external 
representation”, whereas Articles 18 and 27 TEU explicitly provide that the 
High Representative is responsible for the CFSP (only), and that the EEAS is 
to assist the High Representative. 
However, as van Vooren has shown, the legal situation is considerably more 
complex, and the better view probably is that the constitutional framework 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is ambiguous and that the Treaties leave a 
considerable degree of flexibility as regards the division of tasks between 
the Commission and the High Representative/EEAS in the field of external 
relations.159 In particular, the general task of the High Representative and 
the EEAS to ensure consistency in EU external relations suggests that 
the Treaties do not preclude these new actors from playing a (partial) role 
also in the formulation and implementation of development cooperation 
policy. Arguably, the Treaties therefore do not preclude a (partial) transfer 
of development cooperation policy from the European Commission to 
156 White & Case LLP, Memorandum entitled Legal Objections to the EEAS’ Involvement in 
EU Development Cooperation Activities (Apr. 16, 2010), at para. 3.7.
157 Id. at para. 3.11. See also at para. 3.9.
158 White & Case LLP, supra note 144, at para. 3.11.
159 See van Vooren, supra note 141, particularly at pp. 486–491.
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the EEAS.160 In this light, as noted by Duke and Blockmans, the debate 
surrounding the transfer of development cooperation to the EEAS should 
centre less on issues of legality and more on how development-related 
interests can be upheld in the EEAS.161
At present, a compromise has been struck whereby the EEAS has been given 
the task of political coordination as regards a number of external assistance 
instruments.162 This is merely a power of coordination, however. Thus, the 
competence actually transferred to the EEAS is procedural in nature and 
does not concern policy issues. The management of the Union’s external 
cooperation programmes remains the responsibility of the Commission.163 
As the discussions about division of development cooperation competence 
between the Commission and the EEAS have shown, the Lisbon Treaty’s 
introduction of the EEAS has created a new source of constitutional conflict. 
It is likely that this conflict will be revived in the next revisions of the division 
of tasks between, on the one hand, the Commission and, on the other hand, the 
High Representative and the EEAS.164
160 See likewise Simon Duke & Steven Blockmans, The Lisbon Treaty Stipulations 
on Development Cooperation and the Council Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) 
Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action 
Service, CLEER Legal Brief (2010), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/
documents/542010_121127CLEER%20Legal%20Brief%202010-05.pdf. But contrast 
with Mirjam van Reisen, Note on the Legality of Inclusion of Aspects of EU Development 
Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance in the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
(2010), available at http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EEPA_briefing_paper_EEAS.
pdf, who at p. 2 observes: “The Lisbon Treaty defines no powers to divide development 
cooperation policy and humanitarian assistance between the EEAS and the Commission. 
Any such proposals should be regarded as illegal under the Treaty.”
161 Duke & Blockmans, supra note 148, at p. 14.
162 This is in line with the Report of 23 October 2009 from the Swedish Presidency to the European 
Council on the European External Action Service (DOC 14930/09) (2009), available at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014930%202009%20INIT.
163 Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/427/EU. See, generally, Steve Blockmans & 
Christophe Hillion (eds.), EEAS 2.0: A Legal Commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/
EU Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action 
Service (CLEER, Working Paper No. 1, 2013), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/
documents/20130220T020029-cleer13-1_web.pdf.
164 See, Isabelle Tannous, The Programming of EU’s External Assistance and Development Aid 
and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO, 18 european foreign 
affairS revieW 329 (2013).
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4 Conclusions and Future Challenges
In section 2 we explained that, leaving aside the special provisions on the 
OCTs, the Rome Treaty mainly left it for the Court of Justice to define the 
basic legal framework for the Union’s development cooperation policy. In case 
law from this period, the Court largely supported the Commission’s approach 
with regard to the place and importance of development cooperation policy 
in the EU constitutional system. The Court’s case law gives rise to three 
general observations: First, the Court accepted that the common commercial 
policy, the Union’s predominant external policy at the time, could be broadly 
construed, and thus used to pursue development cooperation policy objectives. 
In this way, important aspects of development cooperation policy were 
brought within the confines of the Union’s exclusive competence. Arguably, 
apart from relations with the OCTs, the legal constitutional framework 
established in this case law created a trade-biased foundation for the Union’s 
and the Member States’ development cooperation policy. Secondly, outside 
the common commercial policy field, the Union’s development cooperation 
policy competence was weak. Thirdly, it was clear from early on that the 
financing mechanism formed an important way to influence the Union’s 
development cooperation policy. Attempts by the European Parliament to 
gain influence through its budgetary prerogatives were not supported by 
the Commission and failed when the Court firmly rejected to expand the 
concurrent nature of the Union’s development cooperation policy competence 
through the Parliament’s budgetary powers.
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the rules of the 
game changed. The Union’s development cooperation was given a Title in 
the EEC Treaty, and thus a policy of its own. This continues to constitute 
the single most important constitutional change to the EU’s development 
cooperation policy. The new Treaty provisions were based on three legs – 
often referred to as the three C’s – laying down the principles, inter alia, for 
how the European Union and the Member States were to cooperate in the field 
of development cooperation. After Maastricht, new competence conflicts over 
the precise delimitation of the European Union’s development cooperation 
policy vis-à-vis other policies arose, most famously in the India Agreement 
case, which continues to be a leading authority. Finally, after Maastricht, 
the “cohabitation” of development cooperation and the European Union’s 
promotion of its own values (in particular, human rights and democracy) were 
challenged.
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The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of changes to the constitutional 
legal framework, which governs the Union’s development cooperation policy. 
Some of these changes are codifications and (technical) adjustments, which 
will not give rise to significant problems in the future. Other changes may 
have a longer-lasting impact and carry the potential for future constitutional 
conflicts, which may influence on the Union’s ability to carry out an effective 
development cooperation policy. First and foremost, the Lisbon Treaty, 
we submit, by reorganising and streamlining the Union´s development 
cooperation policy objectives, leaves a lasting constitutional impact on this 
policy. The explication and reorganisation of the Union’s external relations 
objectives and principles and the streamlining of the development cooperation 
policy objective (i.e. the identification of poverty reduction/eradication as 
a primary objective) are likely to have a lasting constitutional impact on 
policy-making and legal methodology in this area. We expect this change 
to be incremental and probably largely unnoticed in the day-to-day politics, 
however. Furthermore, our analysis of the scope and nature of the Union’s 
competences and the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
suggests that post-Lisbon the European Union’s development cooperation 
policy is faced with three main legal, constitutional challenges:
I  The organisation of the financial aid aspect of the European Union’s 
development cooperation policy remains crucial. Key concerns are who 
decides for what purposes the money is spent and who controls the actual 
use of the money. An important aspect of this is control over the budget. 
In this regard, the European Parliament has developed into a main actor, 
as is vividly illustrated by the Court’s ruling in the European Investment 
Bank case. Also, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
organisation of the financing remains a very significant challenge for a 
coherent and effective EU development cooperation policy. The Lisbon 
Treaty means that a step – albeit only a small one – has been taken towards 
bringing all development cooperation under the ordinary EU budget, 
which particularly finds support from the European Commission and the 
European Parliament. However, so far little has changed, and it remains 
unclear whether the Lisbon Treaty will result in an improvement of the 
rules of this game, or, conversely, whether it has increased the number of 
scenarios for, and thus the probability of, conflict over budgetary matters. 
II Another set of potential conflicts, which appeared already in Opinion 
1/78 on the Natural Rubber Agreement, is that of finding the right 
constitutional balance for development cooperation policy vis-à-vis other 
policies: The challenge is to allow development cooperation to be a policy 
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in its own right, while finding ways to ensure a coherent overlapping with 
the EU’s other external policy areas. As shown in section 2 above, from 
a constitutional perspective, development cooperation policy in its own 
right (i.e. a policy, which did not merely concern associations with OCTs) 
had a difficult start, partly because of its lack of a strong, independent 
legal basis, and partly because of its very broad policy scope. Moreover, as 
became gradually clear after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the European Union’s development policy is by its nature multi-facetted 
and potentially open-ended. This makes development cooperation 
difficult to demarcate vis-à-vis other policy areas, as is reflected in the 
Court of Justice’s rulings in the India Agreement case, the ECOWAS case, 
and, most recently, the Philippines PCFA case. The latter case shows that 
the dilemma of finding the right balance for this multi-facetted policy 
without diluting either the development cooperation competence or 
other competences of the Union and the Member States concerns both 
the width and the depth of the cooperation. This continues to be a central 
constitutional challenge for the Union. A serious challenge in this respect 
is to avoid future conflicts between the European Union’s common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP), on the one hand, and the Union’s 
other external policies, on the other hand (i.e. ECOWAS-type conflicts). 
III The third and possibly most significant constitutional challenge 
concerns the relationship between the 28 Member States’ development 
cooperation policies and that of the European Union. From a legal point 
of view, this challenge springs from the fact that, on the one hand, the 
Treaties clearly lay down that the Member States and the Union hold 
parallel competences in the field of development cooperation. Whilst, 
on the other hand, in cases such as PFOS the Court of Justice has made 
it clear that the Member States must duly observe the general principle 
of loyal cooperation in areas of shared competence. In the sphere of 
development cooperation, this might be thought to include an obligation 
to ensure external unity and effectiveness of Member State development 
policies vis-à-vis the Union’s development policy. In practice, however, 
such obligation arguably will imply that Member State policies must 
pursue the development cooperation objectives that are laid down in the 
Treaties and which to a considerable extent are a reflection of objectives 
originally established within international fora. Several Mem ber States 
nevertheless pursue broader (and sometimes inconsistent) objectives 
from those found in the Treaties – e.g. openly geopolitical ones. Even 
though the Union’s exercise of development cooperation competence 
cannot pre-empt Member State competences, after Lisbon the Member 
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States’ development cooperation policies may increasingly run counter 
to the reinforced horizontal requirements in EU external relations law, 
such as the duty of loyal cooperation. Whilst this is not a constitutional 
challenge that can be attributed directly to any specific change made by 
the Lisbon Treaty, the general changes to the rules governing the Union’s 
external relations introduced by Lisbon appear to have exacerbated this 
problem.
In addition to these three main legal, constitutional challenges, the Lisbon 
Treaty has introduced new battlefields for institutional conflicts, including 
that between the Parliament and the Commission concerning the choice 
between delegating and implementing acts and that concerning division of 
tasks between the Commission and the EEAS. The former, in our view, is 
a variation of the classic legal basis conflict. As regards the latter, perhaps 
contrary to other recent studies, we do not consider the much-debated conflict 
concerning the division of tasks between the Commission and the EEAS to 
have a constitutional impact similar to the three above-mentioned issues. 
In our view, though the vagueness is unfortunate, and though the conflict is 
intellectually challenging, we consider this challenge to be manageable.  
As can be seen, none of the above three constitutional challenges is new, 
and none was unknown to the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty. There is, in fact, 
abundant case law on all three issues, which provides ample evidence of the 
interests at stake and the potential for conflicts. The vagueness with which 
previous Treaties have dealt with the challenges was also notorious. So, if 
the success of the Lisbon reform should be measured by its ability to avoid 
repetition of old conflicts and to introduce novel instruments for an efficient 
development cooperation policy, the Lisbon Treaty must be considered 
a modest achievement: The issue of financing has been left open, the very 
notion of ‘development cooperation policy’ continues to be vague and 
open-ended, potentially covering any aspect of cooperation with developing 
countries; and the mechanisms of coordination between the Union and its 
Member States, which are essential to ensure an effective and coherent policy 
vis-à-vis specific third countries, are sketchy at best. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that the Union’s development cooperation policy has been 
capable of evolving to what it is today within an incomplete constitutional 
framework.
Overall, we submit that, despite the fact that the old constitutional challenges 
remain, we can identify the following two overall positive tendencies, which 
are likely to continue: First, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, 
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the European Union has had a development cooperation policy framework 
with a global and comprehensive outlook. Second, thanks to four decades 
of Court of Justice rulings, this policy is now governed by well-known legal 
principles – including notably principles to define the legal basis and the duty 
of loyal cooperation – some of which have even been refined and, partly, 
codified in the Lisbon Treaty. The global outlook of the Union’s development 
cooperation policy post Lisbon, and the increasing institutionalisation of 
the legal constitutional framework, which governs this policy, are positive 
signs that the Union and its Member States are moving towards a framework, 
which will gradually construct a more coherent and efficient development 
cooperation policy for the EU. 
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Sammanfattning på svenska
Den här rapporten identifierar och redogör för de förändringar 
som Lissabonfördraget*1 har medfört när det gäller EU:s politik för 
utvecklingssamarbete. Rapporten beskriver hur dessa förändringar har påverkat 
det ”europeiska områdets” (dvs. EU och medlemsländerna) möjligheter att 
agera som en sammanhållen och effektiv kraft på den internationella arenan 
vad gäller utvecklingssamarbete. Rapporten granskar endast de juridiska och 
konstitutionella aspekterna av EU:s utvecklingssamarbete, dvs. de aspekter 
som är direkt kopplade till EU:s primärrätt, i synnerhet fördragen. Den 
behandlar således inte sekundärlagstiftningen (direktiv, förordningar och 
beslut).
Från Romfördragets ikraftträdande 1958 till dess att Maastrichtfördraget 
började gälla 1993 var det – bortsett från de speciella bestämmelserna om 
utomeuropeiska länder och territorier (OCT-områden) – i huvudsak upp 
till Europeiska unionens domstol att definiera det grundläggande juridiska 
ramverket för EU:s politik för utvecklingssamarbete. Rättspraxis från den 
perioden visar att domstolen för det mesta har stött Europeiska kommissionens 
inställning vad gäller vikten av utvecklingssamarbetet och den roll det 
spelar inom EU:s konstitutionella system. Domstolen gick exempelvis med 
på att den gemensamma handelspolitiken – det vid den tiden dominerande 
inslaget i EU:s utrikespolitik – gavs en bred tolkning och därigenom kunde 
användas för att uppnå målsättningarna inom utvecklingssamarbetet, 
vilket medförde att viktiga aspekter inom politikområdet hamnade inom 
ramen för EU:s exklusiva befogenhet. Rapporten visar att bortsett från 
relationerna till OCT-området, etablerade det konstitutionella ramverket via 
rättspraxis en handelsbaserad grund for unionens och medlemsländernas 
utvecklingssamarbete. En annan slutsats vad gäller perioden är att om man 
bortser från den gemensamma handelspolitiken så var unionens politik för 
utvecklingssamarbete i övrigt outvecklad. En tredje slutsats är att det redan 
tidigt stod klart att finansieringsmekanismen var viktig om man ville påverka 
unionens politik för utvecklingssamarbete. Europaparlamentets försök att 
genom sina budgetprivilegier skaffa inflytande över utvecklingssamarbetet 
fick inte stöd av kommissionen och EU-domstolen avvisade bestämt alla 
försök att den vägen utvidga EU:s kompetens inom området. 
* Lissabonfördraget om ändring om fördraget om Europeiska union och fördraget om 
upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, undertecknat i Lissabon den 13 december 2007, 
2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [härefter Lissabonfördraget]. 
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En andra period inleddes med Maastrichtfördragets ikraftträdande 1993. 
I och med det fick EU:s utvecklingssamarbete en egen rubrik i det dåvarande 
EG-fördraget och därmed också ett eget politikområde. Detta kvarstår 
som den enskilt viktigaste konstitutionella förändringen vad gäller EU:s 
utvecklingssamarbetspolitik. Bestämmelserna i det nya fördraget vilade på tre 
ben som fastställde principerna bl.a. för hur EU och medlemsländerna skulle 
samarbeta inom utvecklingssamarbetsområdet. Inte desto mindre uppstod, 
även efter Maastricht, nya konflikter när det gäller frågan om befogenheter 
och den exakta avgränsningen mellan EU:s utvecklingssamarbetspolitik 
och andra politikområden. Efter Maastricht ifrågasattes dessutom 
”sammanblandningen” mellan utvecklingssamarbetet och EU:s främjande av 
de egna värderingarna (i synnerhet de mänskliga rättigheterna och demokrati).
En tredje period inleddes i och med ikraftträdandet av Lissabonfördraget 
2009. Med det infördes ett antal förändringar i det konstitutionella 
juridiska ramverk som styr EU:s utvecklingssamarbetspolitik. Vissa av 
dessa förändringar är kodifieringar och (tekniska) justeringar som inte 
kommer att medföra några större tolkningsproblem i framtiden. Andra kan 
få mer bestående effekter och eventuellt leda till framtida konstitutionella 
konflikter, vilka i sin tur kan påverka unionens möjligheter att driva en 
effektiv utvecklingssamarbetspolitik. Men framför allt har Lissabonfördraget 
– genom att lägga grunden för ett effektivare utvecklingssamarbete – haft 
en varaktig konstitutionell påverkan på politikområdet. Klargörandet av 
EU:s utrikespolitiska målsättningar och principer och effektiviseringen 
av utvecklingssamarbetet (där bekämpande av fattigdom är den primära 
målsättningen) kommer troligtvis att ha bestående konstitutionell inverkan 
på politiken och den juridiska metodologin inom området. De här beskrivna 
förändringarna kommer förmodligen att ske stegvis och därför troligtvis 
knappast märkas i den dagliga politiken. Det är dessutom högst troligt att 
EU:s politik för utvecklingssamarbete efter Lissabonfördraget står inför tre 
stora konstitutionella utmaningar:
Organiseringen av det ekonomiska biståndet kommer även i fortsättningen 
att vara en avgörande aspekt av EU:s politik för utvecklingssamarbete. 
Att hitta rätt konstitutionell balans för utvecklingssamarbetet i förhållande till 
andra politikområden.
Relationen mellan de 28 medlemsländernas politik för utvecklingssamarbete 
och EU:s motsvarande politik.
Utöver dessa tre konstitutionella utmaningar, pekar rapporten på att 
Lissabonfördraget också har medfört att nya institutionella konfliktytor har 
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uppstått. Som exempel kan nämnas konflikten mellan Europaparlamentet och 
kommissionen vad gäller valet mellan delegerade akter och genomförandeakter 
och konflikten rörande fördelningen av uppgifter mellan kommissionen och 
Europeiska utrikestjänsten (EEAS).
Sammanfattningsvis konstaterar rapporten att trots att gamla konstitutionella 
utmaningar kvarstår, är det likväl möjligt att peka på två övergripande 
positiva tendenser: För det första, att EU sedan Maastrichtfördraget trädde i 
kraft har ett ramverk för utvecklingssamarbete som präglas av en global och 
heltäckande hållning. För det andra, att denna politik numera  – tack vare 
fyra decenniers avgöranden i EU-domstolen – styrs av etablerade juridiska 
principer. Det gäller inte minst de principer, varav några har renodlats och 
delvis kodifierats i Lissabonfördraget, som definierar den rättsliga grunden 
för samarbetet samt skyldigheten att respektera principen om lojalt samarbete. 
Den globala hållning som har präglat EU:s politik för utvecklingssamarbete 
sedan Lissabonfördragets ikraftträdande och den ökande institutionaliseringen 
av det juridiska ramverk som styr politikområdet är två positiva tecken på att 
EU och dess medlemsländer rör sig mot något som gradvis kommer att leda 
till en bättre sammanhållen och effektivare politik för utvecklingssamarbete.
86
SIEPS publications available in English
2014
2014:6
EU External Action in the Field of Development 
Cooperation. The impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Authors: Morten Broberg and Rass Holdgaard
2014:2
The impact of the financial crisis on European 
housing systems: a review
Authors: Christine Whitehead, Kathleen 
Scanlon and Jens Lunde
2014:4epa
Why vote at an election with no apparent 
purpose? Voter turnout at elections to the 
European Parliament 
Author: Mark N. Franklin
2014:3epa
The EU Budget and balance of Powers 
between the European Parliament and the EU 
Governments
Author: Sara Hagemann
2014:2epa
Between a rock and a hard place: the future of 
EU treaty revisions
Author: Carlos Closa
2014:1epa
Scrutiny in Challenging Times – National 
Parliaments in the Eurozone Crisis
Authors: Katrin Auel and Oliver Höing
2013
2013:8
Close Encounters of the Third Kind: The 
Interface between the EU and International 
Law after the Treaty of Lisbon
Author: Ramses A. Wessel
2013:7
Regulating Lifestyles in Europe: How to 
Prevent and Control Non-Communicable 
Diseases Associated with Tobacco, Alcohol 
and Unhealthy Diets?
Authors: Alberto Alemanno and Amandine 
Garde
2013:6
The Future of the Schengen Systems
Author: Steve Peers 
2013:5
Immigration to Sweden from the New EU 
Member States
Authors: Christer Gerdes and Eskil Wadensjö
2013:4
Institutions, Policies and Growth in Europe: 
Quality versus Stability
Authors: Niclas Berggren, Andreas Bergh and 
Christian Bjørnskov
2013:2
States as Market Participants in the U.S. 
and the EU? Public purchasing and the 
environment
Author: Jason J. Czarnezki
2013:1
EEAS 2.0 – A legal commentary on Council 
Decision 2010/427/EU on the organisation 
and functioning of the European External 
Action Service
Authors: Steven Blockmans, Marise 
Cremona, Deirdre Curtin, Geert De Baere, 
Simon Duke, Christina Eckes, Christophe 
Hillion, Bart Van Vooren, Ramses Wessel and 
Jan Wouters
2013:1op
EEAS 2.0 – Recommendations for the 
amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/
EU on the European External Action Service
Authors: Steven Blockmans, Marise 
Cremona, Deirdre Curtin, Geert De Baere, 
Simon Duke, Christina Eckes, Christophe 
Hillion, Bart Van Vooren, Ramses Wessel and 
Jan Wouters
87
2013:18epa
The outer reach of state obligations under 
deposit guarantee schemes – What can we 
learn from the Icesave case?
Authors: Thor Petursson and Asta Solillja 
Sigurbjörnsdottir
2013:17epa
Towards Cruising Speed? Assessing the EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
Authors: Kristine Kern and Stefan Gänzle
2013:16epa
The European Council – the new centre of EU 
politics
Author: Uwe Puetter
2013:15epa
Why the 2014 European Elections Matter:
Ten Key Votes in the 2009–2013 European 
Parliament
Author: Simon Hix
2013:14epa
Germany at the polls – what Europe can 
expect
Author: Julian Rappold
2013:13epa
A First Leadership Trial: What to Expect from 
the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council
Author: Margarita Šešelgyte
2013:11epa
Enlarging the European Union and deepening 
its fundamental rights
Author: Christopher Hillion
2013:7epa
Strategic Use of Public Procurement – Limits 
and Opportunities
Author: Jörgen Hettne
2013:6epa
Aternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers 
in the Financial Services Sector: A 
Comparative Perspective
Author: Iris Benöhr
2013:3epa
The EU Neighbourhood Competence under 
Article 8 TEU
Author: Christophe Hillion
2013:2epa
The creation of an internal market for 
mortgage loans: A never-ending story?
Author: Christian König
2013:1epa
What to Expect from Ireland´s Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union
Author: Linda Barry
2012
2012:6
Inward Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Union: Regional Distribution and 
Determinants
Authors: José Villaverde and Adolfo Maza
2012:5
Europe Unplugged: Progress, potential and 
limitations of EU external energy policy three 
years post-Lisbon
Author: Bart Van Vooren
2012:3
On the Legitimacy of Monetary Union
Author: Christopher Lord
2012:2
Voting in the Council of the European Union: 
Contested Decision-Making in the EU Council 
of Ministers (1995-2010)
Author: Wim Van Aken
2012:1
The External Dimension of the EU´s Area 
of freedom, Security and Justice: Progress, 
potential and limitations after the Treaty of 
Lisbon
Author: Jörg Monar
88
2012:1op
The 2012 Danish EU Presidency: Going 
green and economical in extraordinary times
Authors: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Julie Hassing 
Nielsen and Catharina Sørensen
2012:15epa
Evaluating the Prospects for Enhanced 
Solidarity in the Common European Asylum 
System
Authors: Eiko Thielemann  and Carolyn 
Armstrong 
2012:14epa
Consumers´ Interest and the EU: A Framework 
for Analysis, with Evidence from the Italian 
Case
Author: Paolo R. Graziano
2012:13epa 
New Paradigms for Banking Regulation
Author: Xavier Freixas
2012:12epa
Response to Crisis
Author: Axel Leijonhufvud
2012:11epa
Stuck in the Exit: the Dynamics of British-EU 
Relations
Author: Roderick Parkes
2012:10epa
The EU and Nuclear Safety: Challenges Old 
and New
Author: Anna Södersten
2012:8epa
The Commission´s Posting Package
Authors: Jonas Malmberg and Caroline 
Johansson
2012:7epa
The Greek Elections of 2012 and Greece´s 
Future in the Eurozone
Author: Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos
2012:6epa
Common Fisheries Policy Reform and 
Sustainability
Author: Jill Wakefield
2012:4epa
Eurobonds, Flight to Quality, and TARGET2 
Imbalances
Author: Erik Jones
2012:3epa
The Hungarian Constitution of 2012 and its 
Protection of Fundamental Rights 
Author: Joakim Nergelius
2012:2epa
The EU and Climate Treaty Negotiations after 
the Durban Conference
Author: Katak Malla
2012:1epa
The EU’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria 
and Romania after EU Accession (2012:1epa)
Authors: Milada Anna Vachudova and Aneta 
Spendzharova
Fleminggatan 20
SE-112 26 Stockholm
Ph: +46-(0)8-586 447 00
Fax: +46-(0)8-586 447 06
E-mail: info@sieps.se
www.sieps.se
